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Abstract
Extra-legal variables are factors within a trial that are logically irrelevant to the
determination of a verdict. They are deemed extra-legal as they are extra to the law and
are not prescribed in the relevant statutes upon which the relevant issue must be decided.
Research investigating judicial decision-making, however, demonstrates that extra-legal
variables often affect jurors' judgements and improperly influence their decision-making.
Examples of extra-legal variables include the personal attributes of trial participants, e.g.,
the victim's physical attractiveness, socio-economic status, and age. Studies conducted
in North America indicate that the race of the victim and defendant inappropriately
influences jurors' decision-making. However, to date, no such published research has
been conducted in Australia. Due to Australia's diverse population, which consists of
several minority groups and a dominant Caucasian group, it is likely that race may act as
an extra-legal variable. Furthermore, several Australian studies have documented a strong
prejudice against Aborigines and Asians, with the potential for a newly emerging
prejudice against individuals from Middle-Eastern countries. The present study
investigated whether the race of the victim would affect jurors' perceptions and
judgements in a simulated attempted-rape trial. Research also indicates that the process
of deliberation amongst other things, can affect the influence of extra-legal variables on
decision-making, and that it can either exaggerate or attenuate this influence. Therefore,
the impact of deliberation on the jurors' perceptions and judgements was investigated,
and also whether an interaction occurred between race and deliberation. One hundred and
six participants were recruited to examine the effects of the race of the victim on their
judgements of the defendant, crime, and victim. Due to Australia having a dominant
Caucasian race, it was assumed that when the victim is Aboriginal, Asian or of a Middle
Eastern origin, jurors' judgements of the defendant, crime and the victim will be
negatively prejudiced by the victim's race, and that when the victim is Caucasian, no such
prejudice will impact upon the jurors' decision-making. It was also assumed that
deliberation would attenuate the influence of the extra-legal variable of the victim's race,
such that any bias observed in pre-deliberation judgements will be reduced in post
deliberation judgements. The quantitative data was analysed with a series of 4 x 2
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repeated measures ANOVAs and a qualitative analysis was undertaken of the deliberation
discussions. Quantitative results revealed no significant effects for victim race. However,
the effect for race approached significance regarding the seriousness of the crime, with
the crime perceived as least serious for the Middle-Eastern victim. The pattern of results
identified across several items also revealed a consistent trend toward the different races.
An overall positive trend was observed toward the Aboriginal victim, and a negative
trend identified toward the Middle-Eastern victim, and to a lesser extent, the Caucasian
victim. Qualitative analyses support this pattern of results. The effect for deliberation
revealed a number of significant findings, with the victim's character perceived as more
positive, and the defendant as less guilty following deliberation. Significant interactions
were also identified regarding the defendant's sentence and the responsibility of the
victim. In particular, following deliberation, the defendant in the Caucasian condition
was given a significantly reduced sentence, and the Asian victim was perceived as
significantly less responsible. The results are discussed in terms of the need for closer
analyses of Australian intergroup relations, social desirability and cultural stereotyping,
and their influence on courtroom decisions.
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INTRODUCTION

For many years, the jury has been the subject of intense interest, curiosity and
scrutiny (Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000). As Kalven and Zeisel (1966) proposed, much of
this interest likely stems from the incredible amount of responsibility and power granted
to a jury. Not only do the decisions of the jury have a large and far-reaching impact on
the individuals taking part in a given trial, but they also affect the greater community and
the justice system. Furthermore, also of concern is that the jury employs laymen, chosen
at random from the wider population, often including the uneducated, the unemployed,
and people who pay very little attention to the news and current events (Ellsworth &
Reifman, 2000). Such people are then entrusted with great and powerful decisions in a
technical and serious business of which they often have very little or no experience
(Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). For these reasons, recent decades have seen the jury subjected
to frequent criticisms and numerous investigations and research evaluations, in particular
regarding the competency and processes of jurors' and juries' decision-making (Devine,
Clayton, Dunford, Seying & Price, 2001; Hastie, 1993).
An area of jury decision-making that has attracted the attention ofresearchers are
the biases in this process, commonly known as extra-legal variables (MacCoun, 1990),
and the effect of deliberation on these biases (Kramer, Kerr & Carrol, 1990). Extra-legal
variables are factors that are extra to the law, as they are not found in relevant statutory
law (Nagel, 1983), and which often influence and prejudice jurors' judgements
(MacCoun, 1990). The most commonly researched extra-legal variables are
characteristics specific to trial participants that are irrelevant to the determination of a
verdict (Gordon, 1990; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Such characteristics commonly
include the def endant's age, attractiveness or gender (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994), with
fewer studies examining victim characteristics, including their race (Foley, Adams &
Goodson, 1996; Willis, 1992).
While no literature that investigates the effect of a victim's race on jury decision
making could be located in Australia, North American research demonstrates that the
race of the victim, and of other trial participants has a significant impact in the courtroom
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(Hymes, Leinhart, Rowe & Rogers, 1993; Sorenson & Wallace, 1995). Due to
Australia's diverse and multicultural population, individuals who present before the court
often represent a diverse range of races. In addition, prejudice toward minority groups is
well documented within Australia (Mellor, 2003; Pedersen & Walker, 1997) and it is for
this reason that the current study investigates the impact of race upon jurors' judgements.
Due to the dearth of research investigating characteristics of the victim, and an abundance
ofresearch examining characteristics of the defendant and other trial participants, this
thesis will examine the race of the victim.
Some studies have suggested remedies to reduce the impact of extra-legal
variables on jury decision-making (Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000). One of these is jury
deliberation (Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; Kramer et al., 1990). One potential effect of
deliberations is that they may serve as a de-biasing technique such that deliberating juries
would be less likely than individual jurors to openly endorse biased or prejudiced
attitudes (Greene, Johns & Bowman, 1999). Reasons for this may include that
deliberations make jurors accountable for their decisions (Tetlock, 1983). Tetlock found
when people have to justify their views, they appeared to engage in pre-emptive self
criticism to anticipate the counter-arguments and objections that potential critics may
raise. In contrast, non-deliberating participants did not engage in such activities, and
instead were cognitively lazy (Tetlock, 1983). As such, deliberation may cause jurors to
realise that they must justify their verdicts to others, and thus reduce their reliance on
biasing, irrelevant information.
To provide a background for the thesis, I will first review the aspects ofjury
decision-making that are important for this research, with specific attention given to race
and deliberation within this context. As the majority of research on the impact of race
within the justice system has been performed in North America (Hymes et al., 1993;
Sorenson & Wallace, 1995), an analysis and review of this research is presented. To
provide a context for the races included in this study, an overview of the literature
examining prejudice and racism toward minority groups within Australia is provided.
Those races who have experienced, or are likely to experience prejudice and racism in
Australia due to recent world events, include Aboriginal, Asian and Middle-Eastern
cultures. As such, these three races will be reviewed. Secondly, special attention will be
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given to reviewing the most frequently utilised methodology in jury decision-making
research that is important in the context of this thesis. I will then report on the results of
this study and discuss these with reference to the relevant literature in this field.
The present study, which was exploratory in nature, investigated whether the race
of the victim (an extra-legal variable), and the process of deliberation, would influence
jurors' perceptions and judgements of the defendant, the victim and the crime. Also of
interest was whether an interaction would occur between the victim's race and
deliberation, and in particular, whether deliberation would cause an attenuation or
exaggeration of any racial bias that may exist. Due to the ever changing nature of
intergroup relations and a lack of comparative analyses in past racial research in
Australia, combined with debates over the effect of deliberation on extra-legal variables,
precise directional hypotheses were not made. However, it was anticipated that the
Caucasian victim should benefit from being part of the dominant race in Australia, by
being perceived in a more positive manner than the other relevant races in Australia
(Aboriginal/Asian/Middle-Eastern victims). Therefore, this should result in her being
viewed as more favourable regarding victim honesty, reliability, likeableness, value,
responsibility and sympathy. In addition, the crime should be perceived as being more
serious and as having a larger impact on the Caucasian victim as compared to the other
races. Finally, it is assumed that the favourable attitude toward the Caucasian victim
should affect perceptions and judgements of the defendant in this condition, regarding his
guilt and the recommended sentence.
For the purpose of clarity, the term bias is used in this thesis to refer to both
positive or negative tendencies toward a group of individuals, (e.g., a racial group) based
solely upon their group membership. For example, the tendency to find group A more
favourable than group B based solely upon group A's membership, is an example of a
positive bias toward group A; and a tendency to find a group less favourable than
another, is an example of a negative bias.
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REVIEW OF JURY DECISION-MAKING RESEARCH
The past few decades have seen numerous studies conducted in the field ofjury
decision-making (Abshire & Bornstein, 2003; Baumeister & Darley, 1982; Kameda,
1991; Saks, 1996). The findings from such research are both informative and beneficial,
as they may influence and assist lawyers in their preparation and delivery of cases to the
jury, improve the law by improving jury performance, and provide a greater
understanding for the way in which juries behave (Hastie, 1993). A comprehensive
review of the last 45 years of research on juries and decision-making was recently
completed by Devine et al. (2001). From this review, four main themes emerged. These
concerned the process by which jurors reach their decisions; the influence of
characteristics of the jury members; the implications of a trial with ambiguous evidence;
and the deliberation process. A brief examination of each of these themes will provide a
useful context for this study.
The Jurors' Decision-Making Process
In the interest of providing a fair trial for all involved, the legal system requires
that legal decisions are made using legal factors and criteria which are specifically
prescribed in the relevant statutory law (Nagel, 1983). For this to occur, several
assumptions exist regarding the process by which juries make their decisions. Among
these assumptions is that jurors are able and willing, to use or avoid information (e.g.,
evidence, pre-trial publicity, opening and closing arguments), and evaluate this
information in ways that reflect the requirements and constraints of the law (Wegener,
Kerr, Fleming & Petty, 2000). However, the first theme identified from the review on
jury decision-making indicated that jurors often fail to make decisions in the manner
intended by the courts, regardless of how they are instructed (Devine et al., 2001). If one
examines the literature, it appears that what the courts expect is best demonstrated with
reference to Pennington and Hastie's (1981) model. This model has divided the jury's
task, as prescribed by the courts and legal professionals, into eight components:
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a) The jurors must encode the trial contents: The juror is expected to pay attention to,
encode and remember not only all of what is said at the trial verbatim, but also make
observations of the defendant and witnesses behaviour.
b) The jury must define the legal categories as they are presented in the judge's
instructions: It is assumed that the juror has an accurate recording of events during
the trial and is able to establish the judgement categories, based on information in the
judge's instructions about substantive statutory issues, (e.g., mental state,
circumstances, actions for the verdict choices).
c) The jury must select admissible evidence: The jury is instructed and expected to
ignore the evidence that is inadmissible ( e.g., the attorneys' opening and closing
arguments, the attorneys' behaviour), and select only the admissible evidence.
d) The jury must construct the sequence of events: The jury are expected to determine
what happened at the time of the alleged crime by constructing the sequence of
events and evaluate the credibility of this sequence. Not all of the details of a
potential sequence are specified in trial testimony, and as such, this task involves
inference procedures. The ideal juror would include each piece of evidence in
appropriate temporal or causal sequence, give equal regard to evidence throughout
the trial, include alternative event representations, and make use of appropriate world
knowledge, to construct a coherent account of the events in question.
e) The jury must evaluate the credibility of the witnesses: Jurors are expected to
evaluate the credibility of witnesses by examining their statements with relevance to
two attributes; the credibility of the statement (how likely it is that it is true) and the
probity of the statement (its implications for guilt in terms of actions, circumstances
or mental state).
f) The jury must evaluate the evidence in relation to the legal categories provided in the
instructions: As certain elements of the story the jury constructs are particularly
important in determining the appropriate verdict, the jury is expected to identify
these elements and understand how differences in the interpretation of the facts
translate into differences in the appropriate verdict choice.
g) The jury must apply the procedures for presumption of innocence and reasonable
doubt: The jury is expected to test its interpretation of the facts and the implied
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verdict choice against the standard of proof: preponderance of evidence, clear and
convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt.
h) The jury must decide on the verdict.
However, if one examines the literature on how decisions by juries are actually
made, it is clear that this model is rarely followed. Instead, as Devine et al. (2001)
acknowledge, decades of research on human cognition suggest that this model would
rarely hold in the real world, as decisions are more commonly based upon past
experiences in the form of stereotypes, schemas and scripts, and other cognitive
mechanisms including personal beliefs and values about what is right, wrong and fair.
Other research states that the reason individuals utilise such processes is to simplify
large amounts of information into smaller, more comprehensible amounts (Kunda &
Thagard, 1996; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). When faced with multiple sources of
information, individuals attempt to make sense of it by integrating and deciphering the
meaning of such information. To make this process easier, the individual's pre-existing
knowledge base that includes representations of social constructs such as stereotypes,
traits, and behaviours as well as the interrelationships among these constructs, is utilised
(Kunda & Thagard, 1996).
The most commonly used cognitive simplification methods include schemas,
stereotypes, and scripts (Hilton & Hippel, 1996; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000).
Schemas are commonly referred to as cognitive structures that represent knowledge about
a concept or a type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those
attributes (Fiske, 1995). In other words, schemas are preconceptions or theories about the
social world. A stereotype is similar to a schema for a particular role. Stereotypes
represent peoples' expectations about people who fall within particular categories, e.g.,
nurses, males. Finally, scripts are similar to schema's for different events, and contain
appropriate sequences of events for particular social situations, e.g., dining at a restaurant
(Fiske, 1995).
As well as simplifying information processing by allowing the perceiver to rely on
previously stored knowledge in place of incoming information, schemas, stereotypes and
scripts commonly emerge in response to environmental factors. These include different
social roles, differences in power, and group conflicts, all of which are frequently evident
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when one is part of a jury (Hilton & Rippel, 1996). In addition, when jurors are
presented with the confusing task of encoding multiple sources of information and storing
and evaluating this in a prescribed way, it appears likely that any information perceived
as relevant or useful will be used to help the information make sense to them, which is
why they tend to utilise processes such as stereotypes, schemas and scripts (Devine et al.,
2001).
However, while these processes serve as an important function in our everyday
interaction with the world, by simplifying and streamlining the perception process
(Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000), the downside is that they can lead to bias. The finding
that juries fail to make decisions as prescribed by the courts is therefore no surprise.
Nagel ( 1983) states that there is a less than perfect correspondence between formal law
and its application, and that legal rules are but one consideration in judicial decisions. In
addition, while some findings suggest that legally specified criteria play a dominant role
in decision-making, this has been shown to vary across different cases. For these
reasons as well as the way in which individuals have been shown to reach decisions, it
appears that extra-legal variables are inevitable, and that it is impossible to rule out the
operation of subjective factors that introduce discrimination (Nagel, 1983).

Extra-legal Variables
An examination of the literature on jury decision-making reveals that a variety of
extra-legal variables exist, which have a profound impact on the way a juror perceives the
defendant, the victim and the crime, and which can improperly influence subsequent
verdict decisions (Gordon, 1990; Hymes et al., 1993; Krahe, 1988; Wayne, Riordan &
Thomas, 2001; Willis, 1992). Kaplan and Miller (1978) state that extra-legal variables
may be specific to the trial participants (e.g., racial, ethnic or economic prejudice) or
more general (e.g., acquittal or conviction proneness - how likely the juror is to acquit or
convict the defendant). In addition, they may be enduring and stable trait dispositions in
the jurors themselves (e.g., leniency or harshness) or relatively transient, situational states
in the individual (e.g., a temporally and situational induced good or bad mood) (Kaplan
& Miller, 1978).
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Other extra-legal variables, or juridic biases as Devine et al. (2001) name them,
include the tendency to rely on proscribed information (e.g., pre-trial publicity) (e.g.,
Kramer et al., 1990); and testimony ruled inadmissible or irrelevant (Sue, Smith &
Gilbert, 1974), as well as the misuse of available information (e.g., use knowledge of a
defendant's past criminal record not to evaluate his/her credibility but as direct evidence
of culpability for the present offence (Hans & Doob, 1976, cited in Wegener et al., 2000).
The most heavily researched area within the domain of extra-legal biases is arguably that
which focuses upon participant characteristics (Devine et al., 2001). This popularity is
likely due not only to the long-standing focus on individuals in psychology, but from
increasing evidence from research in cognitive science that humans do not process
information in a rational manner, by maximising the use of relevant information, but
instead use other methods (Devine et al., 2001; Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Macrae &
Bodenhausen, 2000). Whilst most studies examining the impact of such extra-legal
variables have focussed on the personal characteristics of the defendant (Bray, 1982;
Gleason & Harris, 1976; Gordon, 1990; Shepherd & Sloan, 1979; Sigall & Ostrove,
1975; Wuensch, Castellow & Moore, 1991), the research conducted on the influence a
victim's characteristics have on the jury has been limited.
Research investigating the personal characteristics of the victim has included their
race (Arkin, 1980; Dean, Wayne, Mack & Thomas, 2000; Foley et al., 1996; Foley &
Pigott, 1997; Gross & Mauro, 1984; Hymes et al., 1993; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994;
Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991; Sorenson & Wallace, 1995; Ugwuegbu, 1979; Willis, 1992),
gender (Clarke & Nightingale, 1997; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994; Wayne et al., 2001),
physical attractiveness (Landy & Aronson, 1969; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994),
respectability (Greene, Koehring & Quiat, 1998; Jones & Aronson, 1973) and age (Foley
& Pigott, 1997; Nunez, McCoy, Clark & Shaw, 1999; Ross, Dunning, Toglia & Ceci,
1990). In particular, jurors' were often prejudiced to victims that were a different race to
their own (Abshire & Bornstein, 2003), who were elderly (Nunez et al., 1999), less
respectable (Greene et al., 1998), and unattractive (Landy & Aronson, 1973). Gender
also impacted upon juror decision-making with regard to sexual harassment, with female
harassers of male victims more likely to be found guilty than males who harassed female
victims (Wayne et al., 2001).
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As Australia's population is very diverse and multicultural, it is expected that a
defining feature of individuals in an Australian courtroom may be their race, in place of
other individual characteristics, which may impact as extra-legal variables. Of particular
interest is the effect that the race of the victim may have on jurors' perceptions of
themselves, the crime, the defendant and their subsequent verdict. The majority of
research investigating the impact of race in the courtroom has been conducted in North
America. Due to the absence of such published research in Australia, an analysis of the
research conducted in North America is presented next.
A considerable proportion of this research demonstrates how prejudice and racism
affects the legal system within the interplay of the defendant, victim, and crime (Hymes
et al., 1993). A study by Willis (1992) examined how victim and defendant race affected
jurors' perceptions of victims ofa simulated rape trial. Willis found that black victims
were perceived as less truthful and more responsible for the crime than white victims
were. More recently, Dean et al. (2000) found that victim race had a significant impact
upon jurors' verdicts. Defendants were perceived as more likely to be guilty when the
victim of a crime was white, than if the victim was a minority. A meta-analysis by
Mazzella & Feingold {1994) demonstrated similar results, with the finding that jurors
recommended greater punishments for the defendant when the victim was white than
when the victim was black. Interestingly, the findings from inter-racial crime (when the
race of the victim and defendant are different) also produce a considerable biasing effect.
Here, defendants who commit a crime against a victim of another race are more likely to
receive a guilty verdict than when the victim's race is identical to their own (Ugwuegbu,
1979). In line with this finding, Pfeifer and Ogloff(l 991) also demonstrated that black
defendants were found guilty significantly more than white defendants when their victims
were white.
In addition, a number of studies examining the relationships between victim race,
defendant race and the imposition of the death penalty using data from court records and
juror interviews in the United States demonstrate similar findings of prejudice in the legal
system (Arkin, 1980; Gross & Mauro, 1984). It found that the race of the victim was an
important factor in the determination of who received the death penalty, with killers of
white victims generally found to have higher odds than the killers of black victims.
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Furthermore, victim race was found to interact with defendant race such that a black
defendant killing a white victim stood a much greater chance of receiving the death
penalty than a white defendant killing a white victim (Sorenson & Wallace, 1995). The
General Accounting Office for the American Federal Government (1990, cited in Devine
et al., 2001) also conducted a review on all empirical studies investigating the issue of
race in capital sentencing. The review concluded that the race of the victim influenced
the likelihood of a defendant being charged with murder and receiving the death penalty,
with a race of victim effect indicated in 82% of the studies reviewed. Although the bias
was sometimes stronger at the prosecutorial stage, it was also observed at the jury verdict
stage (Devine et al., 2001).
Foley et al. (1996) similarly found that judgements formed by officials of the
court, such as judges, attorneys, and probation officers, were also influenced by the race
of the individuals involved in the offense, with both the race of the defendant and victim
having a significant impact upon perceptions of the defendant's criminality. However, in
contrast to the findings from previously mentioned studies, defendants with White
victims received shorter sentences than did defendants with minority victims.
Furthermore, the crime was seen as more serious, and defendants were given longer
sentences when the victim was a minority than when the victim was White.
As the literature illustrates, extra-legal variables can produce a significant impact
in the courtroom (MacCoun, 1990; Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Furthermore, North
American research indicates that the race of the victim can also influence the judgements
formed by jurors' regarding the victim, defendant, crime and subsequent verdict.
Australian Racial Research

As previously mentioned, there is very little research documenting racial biases in
Australia and less that links prejudice to the court system. Research that has investigated
racial biases in Australia has instead explored racism in government policy (Sanson et
al., 1998), political issues (Chamarette, 2000), as biases introduced as a result of media
coverage (Duck, Lalonde & Weiss, 2003), and Aborigines' experiences with the mental
health and justice systems, including biases regarding their assessment and treatment
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(Kyaw, 1993). The little research that has been conducted demonstrates that prejudiced
attitudes have been identified toward Aborigines and Asian people (Sanson et al., 1998),
and as demonstrated later in the thesis, there appears to be an emergent level of racism
toward individuals from Middle-Eastern countries.
Interestingly, an examination of the research also identified the presence of
different forms of prejudice, including modern and aversive racism (Augoustinos, Tuffin
& Sale, 1999; Pedersen & Walker, 1997). These forms of prejudice are more frequently
identified as contemporary theories of racism. While several theories are present, the
most widely accepted are that of modern racism and aversive racism (Nail, Harton &
Decker, 2003).
The modem racism theory, coined by Mcconahay (1976), asserts that while
racism still widely exists, it is now typically expressed only in subtle, symbolic or
indirect ways because contemporary societal norms generally oppose such direct
expressions of prejudice (McConahay & Hough, 1976). For example, a modem racist
may still support segregation between black and white persons, however would be
unlikely to publicly support such an attitude because such behaviour would provide clear
and direct evidence that they are prejudiced. Instead, such beliefs may manifest in
behaviours that implicitly indicate prejudiced attitudes, (e.g., crossing the street when a
member of an out-group is ahead, or avoiding heavily populated areas which are
inhabited by out-groups). Thus, the modem racist's traditional beliefs and values allow
them to reject overt racism and reconfigure their negative feelings toward minority
individuals into attitudes, allowing justifiable discrimination. While modem racists are
still said to be prejudiced at heart, having all of the negative feelings and beliefs that
typically accompany such attitudes, they do not admit to such feelings, even to
themselves. Instead, they avoid direct expressions of racism because it is not acceptable
in most contemporary social settings (Nail et al., 2003).
The theories of aversive racism (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998 cited in Nail et al.,
2003) also maintain that racism now tends to be expressed in subtle and indirect ways.
However, these theories are different from that of modem racism as they propose that
many individuals have actually internalised non-prejudiced, egalitarian values to a
degree. At some level, such individuals genuinely believe in the ideals of equality, justice
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and fair treatment for all. However, at the same time, they continue to harbour certain
non-conscious negative emotions and feelings against minority groups. These feelings
are thought to be based on factors such as (a) socialisation experiences in local cultures
with racist traditions and (b) the ongoing competition between social groups in a world
with limited resources. The aversive racism theory therefore obtains this name due to the
underlying emotional conflict that exists between the desire of the individuals to be non
prejudiced, and their anxiety and discomfort when around people of other races (Nail et
al., 2003).
As society generally dictates that individuals should avoid direct expressions of
negative attitudes toward others on the basis of their ethnicity, expressions of modem and
aversive racism are difficult to measure. Research includes the measurement of
involuntary facial expressions, such as electrodermal activity as a psychophysiological
marker of ethnic prtjudice; facial electromyography to differentiate the valence and
intensity of affective reactions; and psychometric measures of modem-prejudice
including the Modem Racism Scale which uses a voluntary self-report from individuals
(Vanman, Paul, Ito & Miller, 1 997).
Australian Aborigines
The relationship between Aborigines and White Australians is characterised by a
history of conflict and controversy, and like many Aboriginal groups across the world,
Australian Aborigines have experienced considerable cultural and social dislocation
(Augoustinos, Ahrens & Innes, 1 994). The present day disadvantaged position of
Aborigines is reflected in the statistics relating to health, finances, life chances, and their
involvement in the justice system. This is discussed in more detail in the following
review of research studies that have examined Aborigines.
A recent study conducted by Mellor (2003) found that Aborigines have three
times the national rate of infant mortality; a disproportionate rates of diabetes, respiratory
disorders, ear and eye diseases, and circulatory disorders. In addition, Aborigines have a
life expectancy that is 20 years lower than the non-Aboriginal population.
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Statistics also indicate that Aborigines are disadvantaged with regard to their
financial situation, with the unemployment level being three times more than the national
unemployment rate. Furthermore, the average income of the Aboriginal population is
one third less than the majority population (Mellor, 2003).
In addition, Mellor (2003) and Sonn, Bishop and Humphries (2000) found that
Aborigines are disadvantaged with regard to life chances. In particular, Aboriginal
students' experiences in mainstream higher education indicated that subtle and overt
forms of racism affected the students' experience and progress. In particular, issues
associated with conflicts between Aboriginal and mainstream cultural values reflected in
course content and levels of support were identified (Sonn et al., 2000).
Numerous studies have also reported an over-representation of Aborigines in
prison (e.g., Allan & Dawson, 2002), as victims or perpetrators of crime (e.g., Allan &
Dawson, 2002), in West Australian courts appearing as juvenile and adult defendants
(Allan, Allan, Giles & Drake, 2003), and as having higher recidivism rates than non
Aboriginal offenders (Allan, Allan, Marshall & Krazlan, 2003).
Allan & Dawson (2002) reported that Aborigines were 14 times more likely to be
in prison than non-Aboriginal people were. This extended to Western Australia, with the
finding that between 1990 to 1991, 35% of all victims and 32% of all perpetrators of
homicide were Aboriginal, despite the fact that Aborigines only represent 2.7% of the
population. Allan, Allan, Giles et al. (2003) similarly identified an overrepresentation of
Aborigines in the criminal justice system. Of 648 defendants observed over seven
different courts in Perth in late 2001, one quarter were observed to be of Aboriginal
origin. Furthermore, nearly one quarter of the adult defendants (24%) and nearly one half
(48%) of the juvenile defendants in this sample were Aboriginal. In addition, research
examining recidivism among male juvenile sexual offenders in Westem Australia
demonstrated that Aborigines had a higher sexual recidivism rate (15.8%) than non
Aboriginal offenders (5.0%) convicted between January 1998 and June 1 998. However,
these findings should be interpreted with caution as the Aboriginal offenders had a longer
follow-up time, and therefore a greater opportunity to be reconvicted (Allan, Allan,
Marshall et al., 2003).
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When compared to the rest of the Australian population, Aborigines are clearly
disadvantaged with reference to their social, health and financial situation. This paired
with their over-representation within the justice system, and their different customs and
world views, makes them a highly salient group within Australian society (Allan, Allan,
Marshall et al., 2003). These findings not only indicate the salience of Aboriginal people
within the Australian population, but may also contribute to an understanding of the
racial biases they experience.
Historically, the Aboriginal population has borne the brunt of prejudice and
several studies have demonstrated the ongoing negative stereotypes, unfavourable
attitudes and prejudice toward Aborigines (Augoustinos et al., 1994; Black-Gutman &
Hickson, 1996; Pedersen & Walker, 1994). Larsen (1981) and Majoribanks and Jordan
(1986) claim that Aborigines are the most discriminated against group in Australian
society. Pedersen, Griffiths, Contos, Bishop and Walker (2000) investigated peoples'
attitudes toward Aborigines in samples from Perth and Kalgoorlie, Western Australia,
and found that most respondents showed some degree of negative feelings about
Aborigines. An earlier study by Pedersen and Walker (1997) found that modern prejudice
was prevalent in Australia, with approximately one-quarter of a local (Perth) sample
scoring above the midpoint on a measure of old-fashioned prejudice, and more than one
half scoring above the midpoint on a measure of modern prejudice. Discursive analyses
by Augoustinos, Tuffin and Sale ( 1999), Augoustinos, Tuffin and Rapley (1999) and
Guilfoyle (2002) also identified a negative construction of Aborigines' social identity in
discussions of focus groups. Although these groups scored low on scales of modern and
old-fashioned racism, and acknowledged that Aborigines were socially and economically
disadvantaged, modern racism was evident in their discourse. This was most commonly
expressed by the participants' significant concerns about the government spending too
much money on programs for the Aboriginal population, with many believing that too
much money was being spent on them unproductively (Augoustinos, Tuffin & Sale,
1999).
In a more recent study Mellor (2003) performed semi-structured interviews on 34
Aborigines and found that a significant level of prejudice in the Australian community
still exists. Participants reported experiencing racism in many forms, including verbal
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abuse, by name-calling, insults and other remarks. A strong emphasis on skin colour was
also associated with verbal abuse, incorporated through a list of derogatory terms.
Racism experienced through behavioural means was also extensively reported. In the
more extreme forms, racism was expressed through physical violence, and harassment
from the police. More subtle forms, such as reports of an awareness of being watched, of
being avoided, of being talked about, and being stereotyped on the basis of race were also
discussed.
In summary, research demonstrates that prejudice toward the Aboriginal
population pervades most sectors of the Australian community and has the potential to
interact with jury decision-making.
Asian

Research on Asian racial groups is also limited, however the large immigration of
Asian groups to Australia over the past century, and a historical White Australia policy
promotes an out-group status in this race, which could impact juridic decision-making.
Walker ( 1994) states that throughout the twentieth century, the predominant view of
migrants and immigration in Australia, held both by government policy and public
opinion, has been assimilationist (e.g., that migrants should be assimilated with the
general population rather than remain distinct). Furthermore, heavy preference was given
to the British and Irish, followed by Northern Europeans, Southern Europeans and others.
In addition, while the position of some groups has fluctuated over the years, (e.g.,
Italians, Germans and Greeks), that of Asian groups remained steadfastly at the bottom
(Walker, 1994).
In a study examining attitudes toward minority groups including Aborigines,
Asians and women in Western Australia, Walker (1994) mailed questionnaires to 500
residents in the Perth metropolitan area. Results from the questionnaires indicated that a
significant amount of prejudice exists in the general community toward Asians. In
particular, prejudice was expressed by individuals in attitudes regarding the high level of
Asians migrating to Australia. Items on the questionnaires that yielded the highest
percentage of negative attitudes indicated that a significant number of participants
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believed that there were too many Asians in the country, and that more Asians should not
be allowed to migrate to Australia. In addition, results from another Australian study
investigating the relationship between racial attitudes and social-cognitive development
in children, found that attitudes to Asians in Australia were only marginally better than
those found toward Aborigines (Black-Gutman & Hickson, 1996).
A more recent review on racism and prtjudice by Sanson et al. (1998)
demonstrated that racism against Asian groups is present in Australia. A search for the
literature cited in Sanson et al. was unsuccessful, and as such, references to this review
unfortunately appear as secondary citations. A nation-wide study by Cahill (1996, cited
in Sanson et al., 1998), showed that racism in the context of Asian groups has a persistent
presence in most schools. In Queensland, 30% of teachers indicated that instances of
racism occurred frequently in their schools, with 25% of teachers surveyed indicating that
they thought Australia was becoming Asianised too quickly. Kee and Hsieh ( 1997, also
cited in Sanson et al., 1998) reported that approximately 50% of Taiwanese students in
Australia reported having experienced racial discrimination, most commonly verbal
abuse, with 15% experiencing physical attacks, 24% encountering racism on the streets,
and 42% being the recipients of discrimination at their educational institution.
In a more recent study, Reid, Higgs, Beyer and Crofts (2002) investigated ethnic
Vietnamese individuals' vulnerability to involvement with illicit drug use and distribution
in Australia. Results demonstrate that factors contributing to the involvement with illicit
drugs by Vietnamese individuals included high levels of unemployment, poor English
proficiency, social and economic difficulties, intergenerational conflicts and
acculturation, and the experience of racism.
Given these findings, it is highly plausible to assume that race may contribute
significantly to the perception of Asian victims by jurors', and that this may influence the
decisions made within the Australian courtrooms.
Middle-Eastern

To date, no existing psychological literature examining racism toward people
from Middle-Eastern cultures in Australia has been located. However, over recent years
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the media's reporting of crimes in Australia's eastern states has demonstrated an
emergent racism toward Middle-Eastern people. An article from a Sydney newspaper
("Multicultural Malignancy," 2001) claimed that in the past two years there have been
more than 70 organised rapes by ethnic gangs (in particular from a Middle-Eastern
background) on Australian women, with claims that the women were subjected to racial
taunts. While the article suggests that the rapists were racist toward Caucasians, an
emerging racism toward the Middle-Eastern culture has resulted in response to the
attacks. A large backlash by the Australian public was well reported, with claims that the
rapes against the Australian women were racially based and committed by Middle
Eastern men against the women because the latter were Caucasian ("Multicultural
Malignancy," 2001).
The gang rape of two Caucasian girls in Sydney's southwest by youths of Middle
Eastern background also received extended national media coverage. Ethnic leaders from
the representing Middle-Eastern communities consequently began demanding an end to
the link between ethnicity and crime, as it was causing much racial tension. In addition,
this counter-racism drew the ire of many callers to talk back radio ("Race Reason for
Rapes - Hanson," 2001).
Furthermore, the debate over ethnic-based crime in Sydney's south-western
suburbs has reportedly had ramifications across the wider community in New South
Wales, with widespread concern about a racially based crime wave ("Anger Over
Ethnicity and Crime", 2001). Of notable concern is the recent incidence of verbal abuse
of Muslim women in Sydney by Caucasian individuals, as an apparent result of the
publicity over the gang rapes by youths described as Lebanese Muslims ("Angry Men",
2001).
Also of concern are recent international and national developments that may
indicate the potential for prejudice toward individuals from Middle-Eastern countries. In
recent years, international terrorist activities have included the bombing of a holiday
destination popular with Australian tourists, and the destruction of the World Trade
Centre Towers in the United States. Both of these events have been received extended
international and national media coverage, and have been linked to Middle-Eastern
terrorist organisations. Research on human cognition indicates that an individual's
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attitude to others is often influenced by information received from a number of sources,
including that of the media (Fiske, 1995). As a result, stereotypes that are formed about
groups of individuals ( e.g., a particular race) are often dependent upon information
received about that particular group. This social psychological theory suggests that an
extended media coverage that presents a negative view of individuals from Middle
Eastern countries may affect the attitudes of individuals toward that particular group.
This may result in prejudiced attitudes toward Middle-Eastern individuals.
The Influence of Jurors' Characteristics on Verdict Outcomes
The second theme identified by Devine et al. (200 1) in the area ofjury decision
making, is that characteristics of individual jurors and mock jurors may predict jury
outcomes better than juror verdict preferences. While the authors emphasise that most of
the studies included in the review have yielded little evidence that individual verdict
preferences are reliably predicted by personal characteristics, they propose that the lack
of a relationship between a particular characteristic and juror verdict preferences does not
imply independence at the jury level. Rather, Devine et al. (2001) suggest that
characteristics associated with jurors may act as substantial biases in some instances,
particularly those stemming from defendant-jury demographic similarity (Abshire &
Bornstein, 2003; Fischer, 1 997), jury personality composition regarding
authoritarianism/dogmatism (Narby, Cutler & Moran, 1993; Shaffer & Case, 1982), and
juror attitudes and values (Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, 1 984).
Research investigating the effect of the demographic composition ofjuries on
their judgements and verdicts has revealed a juror-defendant similarity bias across a
number of studies (Fischer, 1 997). In particular, when the evidence against the defendant
is weak or ambiguous (as in the present study), juries that are demographically similar to
the defendant tend to be more lenient; however, when the defendant's culpability is clear,
juries tend to be more harsh (Devine et al., 2001). In contrast however, results from a
study by Hastie et al. ( 1998) which examined jurors' judgements in civil cases indicated
that while income and ethnicity were very weakly related to juror judgements, individual
differences in the jurors' backgrounds were not strongly related to their verdicts. More
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recently, Abshire and Bornstein (2003) found that the racial composition of the jury can
also have an effect upon judgements and verdicts. In their study, black and white mock
jurors watched a simulation of a murder trial of a black defendant in which the race of the
eyewitness was varied (black/white). The results indicated that black mock jurors were
more lenient than white mock jurors to the black defendant; with white mock jurors
rendering more guilty verdicts if the defendant is black, however eyewitness race had no
effect on the verdict.
Jury outcomes have also been consistently linked to the personality composition
of the jury, with respect to levels of authoritarianism and dogmatism (Devine et al.,
2001). More specifically, juries that contain a high proportion of authoritarian or
dogmatic jurors tend to convict more often, than juries with a low proportion of such
individuals (Shaffer & Case, 1982). Juror attitudes and values have also been linked to
verdict preferences, in particular, with attitudes toward capital punishment. Cowan et al.
(1984) found that jurors that favoured the death penalty were more likely to vote for guilt
before and at the end of deliberation. In addition, juries that consisted of both jurors for,
and against, the death penalty were better able to recall evidence after deliberation, than
those juries composed entirely ofjurors in favour of the death penalty.
While the aforementioned studies demonstrate that the characteristics ofjurors
may have an impact on verdict preferences, research suggests that the bias produced by
the jury composition should have little impact when the evidence clearly favours one side
or the other (Rector, Bagby & Nicholson, 1992). This is discussed in more detail in the
next theme.
The Implications of Ambiguous Evidence
The third theme identified in Devine et al.'s (2001) review on jury decision
making was that Kalven and Zeisel's ( 1966) liberation hypothesis is still supported. The
hypothesis states that the weight of the evidence in a case is the primary determinant of
most jury verdicts. However, when the evidence clearly does not favour one side, they
hypothesised that jurors would be liberated from the constraints of the evidence and be
more susceptible to influence from extraneous and biasing factors (Devine et al., 200 1;
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MacCoun, 1990). Research clearly demonstrates that jury decisions are influenced most
often by the presented evidence, and that a strong and consistent relationship has been
observed between the strength of the evidence and jury verdicts (Devine et al., 2001;
Greene et al., 1999; Horowitz & Kirkpatrick, 1996; Ugwuegbu, 1979). In addition,
several research studies that have identified biases attributable to procedural or
participant characteristics (eg. pre-trial publicity, characteristics of trial participants) have
done so when presenting ambiguous evidence (Bagby, Parker, Rector & Kalemba, 1994;
Baumeister & Darley, 1982; MacCoun, 1990). Furthermore, biases have been observed to
have little to no impact when the evidence is either very strong or very weak (Hymes et
al., 1993; Rector et al., 1992).
The Deliberation Process
The fourth theme identified in the review on jury decision-making by Devine et
al. (2001), relates to the process of deliberation. A large amount of research has been
conducted examining the deliberation process, which has focussed primarily on issues
including initial verdict preferences and their relation to the final verdict (Kalven &
Zeisel, 1966), the influence of task order on group decisions (Davis, Tindale, Nagao &
Hinsz, 1984), the structure and style of deliberation (Hastie et al., 1983; Kameda, 1991),
polling mechanics (Kerr & MacCoun, 1985), faction shifts (Kerr, 198 1), foreperson
characteristics (Foley & Pigott, 1 997), the content of deliberation (Devine et al., 2001),
and the impact of deliberation on extra-legal variables (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983;
London & Nunez, 2000; Wright & Wells, 1985).
The early view on deliberation that hailed from research performed by Kalven and
Zeise! ( 1966) was that deliberation plays a minor role in determining jury verdicts
because the pre-deliberation majority generally prevails in the end (Diamond, 1997).
However, more recent research by Sandys and Dillehay ( 1995) suggests that significant
discussion often precedes any vote by the jury, and considerable opinion shifts often take
place as a result of deliberation. The deliberation process has also been shown to help
realign the juror with the facts and rules of the case, serving an additive function of the
legal standard (Bagby et al., 1994).
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The review on jury decision-making by Devine et al. (2001) demonstrates that the
deliberation process has a significant impact on jury outcomes. The main influence of
deliberation, as identified in the literature, relates to the style of deliberation and its
impact on the jury outcome, and the impact of the deliberation process on extra-legal
variables. A discussion of these two issues follows.
The Impact ofDeliberation Style on Jury Outcome
The style of deliberation primarily refers to the manner in which juries approach their
task of reaching a verdict (Hastie, Penrod & Pennington, 1983). Through observations of
mock juries, Hastie and colleagues identified two styles ofjury deliberations, namely the
verdict-driven and the evidence-driven jury. In the former, juries tend to open their
deliberations with a public expression (e.g., polling) of individual verdict preferences.
The initial exchange ofjurors' verdict preferences, that each juror formed individually
before deliberation began, is the focus of this style of deliberation. After this exchange,
jurors commonly discuss the case whilst being aligned in opposing factions by their
verdict preferences. Relevant evidence is used by jurors' in support of these preferences.
In contrast, the evidence-driven jury, according to Hastie and colleagues, focuses on
reviewing evidence closely and constructing a plausible story of the case. This style of
deliberation begins with an exchange ofjurors' views of the facts, rather then exchanging
overall verdict preferences. The first task set by such juries is to establish the plausible
facts of the case, and end with a final verdict (Kameda, 1991).
Research demonstrates that the evidence-driven style of deliberating is similar to the
normative ideal desired by the courts, which was outlined earlier with reference to
Pennington and Hastie's (1981) model (Kameda, 1991). However, many juries adopt the
verdict-driven style, which leads to the rapid delineation of factions and increases
normative pressure (Sandys & Dillehay, 1995). The verdict-driven style of deliberating
may also prevent minority factions from providing input to the jury discussion, due to
pressure from other members opposing their verdict. In contrast, an evidence-driven
style may allow members of the minority faction to identify others in the jury who share
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the same viewpoint, and allow for a more successful defense of such (Devine et al.,
2001).
The Impact ofDeliberation on Extra-Legal Variables
Research demonstrates that deliberation has a significant impact upon extra-legal
variables (London & Nunez, 2000; Thomson, Fong & Rosenhan, 1981), and has been
proposed by several researchers as a way in which biases may be prevented from
affecting jury decision-making (Ellsworth & Reifman, 2000; Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994;
Kramer et al., 1990). Several studies suggest that this is due to the advantages found in
group decision-making as opposed to decisions made by individuals (McCoy, Nunez &
Dammeyer, 1999). Among these advantages are that groups exhibit advanced thought
processes and memory recall (McCoy et al., 1999; Tetlock, 1983 ), which provides
support that jurors deliberating as a group should make more effective and well-reasoned
decisions, than individual jurors (Greene et al., 1999). A review of these studies is
provided next.
McCoy et al. (1999) investigated differences in the decision-making process
between individual jurors and jurors participating in a group setting. The results indicated
that deliberating jurors exhibited better reasoning skills than individual jurors. In
particular, jurors who engaged in deliberation seemed more aware of alternative theories,
and evidence supporting and not supporting their given verdict, than individual jurors
who did not engage in deliberation. Furthermore, deliberating jurors made more
statements that discounted their chosen verdict and alternative verdicts, and made more
judgmental statements (McCoy et al., 1999). According to Kuhn, Weinstock & Flaton
(1994) considering alternatives and reflecting on evidence is clearly more competent than
not doing so. The finding that deliberating jurors exhibited more advanced reasoning
skills than individual jurors may have also been the result of exposure to different ideas
during deliberations, which may broaden their view and challenge their own opinions
(McCoy et al., 1999).
Greene et al. (1999) also point out that deliberation may act as a corrective
technique, whereby misinterpretations of evidence and instructions can be detected and
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corrected during discussion with other jurors. In addition, deliberation may also enhance
the jurors' involvement with the case, increasing the seriousness and care with which the
jurors' consider and scrutinize the evidence. Tetlock (1983) also demonstrated the
advantages of group discussion on thought processes in a research study investigating the
impact of accountability - the need to justify one's views to others. Results indicated that
having to justify one's position to others with unknown views increases an individual's
accountability and that having to defend ones position leads to an increase in integrative
complexity and helps prevent individuals from becoming cognitively lazy in their
decision-making. This suggests that when deliberating jurors are discussing their
viewpoints, they are more likely to integrate others' ideas and critically analyse them as
compared to individual decision-making, as they become accountable for their opinions
(Tetlock, 1983). In addition, Greene et al. (1999) similarly state that deliberation may act
as a de-biasing technique. This is due to the realisation ofjurors' that they may have to
justify their verdicts and opinions to others, and therefore they tend to make their
decisions based only on relevant evidence. Thus, one would expect the process of
deliberation would lead to a reduction in extra-legal biases as the jurors put more effort
and cognitive work into their judgements and decisions.
Kaplan and Miller (1978) state that biases originate in the individual juror, with
suggestions that the source of bias in individuals is localised in their initial impressions,
which continue to affect the subsequent interpretation of information. In addition, prior
attitudes in individuals appear to affect the importance they consequently place on
congruent and discrepant information regarding the person they are evaluating (Kaplan &
Miller, 1978). Furthermore, since the average recall of the jury should be superior to the
average recall of the individual juror, more evidence should be available for
consideration during the deliberation process, increasing the chances that alternative
options may be discussed. Therefore, even if individual jurors had not contemplated
particular events, involvement in the group may broaden their ability to consider other
scenarios (Kuhn et al., 1994; Ellsworth, 1989). Collectively, the finding that deliberating
jurors exhibit better reasoning skills (McCoy et al., 1999), and that biases originate in
individuals (Kaplan & Miller, 1978), indicate that the competency ofjuries is likely
superior to that of individual jurors.
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Research investigating the impact of deliberation on extra-legal biases, in
particular, whether they are attenuated or exaggerated during the process of deliberation
has been limited, with many early simulation studies excluding deliberation and
focussing on individual judgements (Bagby et al., 1 994; Ffeifer & Ogloff, 1991).
Despite this lack of research, the studies that have examined this process have found
mixed results. A review of this literature is provided next, with eight studies suggesting
that extra-legal variables are attenuated following deliberation, and four studies
indicating that deliberation causes an exaggeration of extra-legal variables.
An early study by Izzett and Leginski ( 1974) demonstrated that extra-legal biases
that were identified prior to jury discussions, were reduced following deliberation.
Results indicated that the contribution of extra-legal variables was lessened when
deliberation allowed the integration oflegally relevant information into the discussion.
More generally, it was found that any conditions that permit the juror to consider and
then integrate relevant information would reduce reliance on preexisting dispositions.
Furthermore, when able to rehearse (or discuss) relevant information, individuals are
better able to integrate the information and draw the response away from the more neutral
preexisting disposition (Izzet & Leginski, 1 974).
In another early study investigating juror bias, Kaplan and Miller ( 1 978)
performed three experiments to explore the contribution of biases to decisions made by
juries, by varying the weight of trial evidence. The authors defined biases as "tendencies
to judge a defendant or issue on a basis apart from the qualities of the defendant, the case,
or the issue" (p. 1 444). More specifically, two categories of biases were indicated, the
first being specific to the defendant or plaintiff (e.g., racial or ethnic prejudice), and the
second being more general (e.g., conviction or acquittal proneness). The results indicated
that judgments made by jurors are a joint function of existing predispositions (biases) and
information pertinent to the judgment (evidence). The common principle behind this
assertion is that the bias decreases as the importance of the evidence increases, in an
inverse function. In their study, Kaplan and Miller found that deliberation resulted in a
reduction ofbiases, and had the dual effect of polarising individual jurors' pre
deliberation responses, and reducing their reliance on biases. They suggested that this
was due to the facts of the case being reiterated during deliberation and as a consequence,
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the jurors took more evidence into account when making their post-deliberation
judgement. Therefore, the jurors' increased reliance on the evidence resulted in a
decrease in their reliance on biases. The authors concluded that biases found in pre
deliberation judgments should therefore be attenuated in post-deliberation judgments, and
judgments should polarise in the direction favoured by the evidence (Kaplan & Miller,
1978).
Kassin and Wrightsman (1983) also provide support for the reduction of extra
legal biases following deliberation, which they state often relies on the jury's foreperson.
In their study, they found that a task-oriented foreperson may focus the jury on the rules
and facts to be considered in the case, thereby reducing informational ambiguity and the
influence of extra-legal biases on decisions made by jurors. In addition, Wright and
Wells (1985) also found support for the attenuation of biases following discussion, by
investigating the impact of deliberation on the dispositional bias (a tendency to attribute
dispositional qualities to an individual, even when they have responded to obvious
situational pressures). Results indicated that the dispositional bias was not only reduced,
but also eliminated, when the individuals were instructed to render their judgement after
deliberating. It was further suggested that discussion made the individuals more cautious
or moderate in their judgements, moving them away from such biases.
This finding is consistent with research demonstrating that mock juries are more
likely to follow judicial instructions to ignore inadmissible evidence and testimony than
are individual mock jurors (Carretta & Moreland, 1983; Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; London
& Nunez, 2000; Thompson et al., 1981). Though few studies have examined the impact
of bias and inadmissible testimony, results indicate that deliberation lessens rather than
increases bias. Caretta and Moreland (1983) performed a study whereby individuals read
a mock trial summary with evidence that favoured either prosecution or acquittal.
Results demonstrated that prior to deliberation, the jurors' verdicts and views toward the
defendant were biased by inadmissible evidence. Following deliberation, jurors in the
pro-acquittal inadmissible evidence condition continued to show bias, however there
were no differences in post deliberation verdicts between jurors in the pro-prosecution
inadmissible and control groups. This suggests that deliberation can in some
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circumstances help jurors' to control the influence of inadmissible evidence on their
decisions.
Further support for deliberation reducing bias due to inadmissible evidence comes
from Kerwin and Shaffer (1994) who investigated whether members of deliberating
juries were more likely than individual jurors to adhere to judicial rulings to ignore
inadmissible evidence. Results indicate that the verdicts of both individual non
deliberating jurors and pre-deliberation jury members were biased. However, it was
found that following deliberation, mock jury members often changed their pre
deliberation verdicts to disregard inadmissible evidence. Further support that deliberation
helps reduce bias caused by the introduction of inadmissible evidence is provided by
Thompson et al. (1981). In this study, three versions of a mock trial were presented to
mock jurors. The first contained inadmissible evidence supporting acquittal, the second
contained inadmissible evidence supporting conviction, while the third mock trial
contained no inadmissible evidence. Results revealed that following deliberation, mock
jury members that received inadmissible evidence supporting conviction were not biased.
Furthermore, bias was only displayed when the inadmissible evidence favoured the
defendant's acquittal. The authors suggested that the pro-acquittal jurors might have been
especially prone to bias because of an intense reluctance to convict an innocent person.
Overall, results displayed that participating in deliberation led to a greater likelihood that
inadmissible testimony would be disregarded.
In a more recent study London and Nunez (2000) found that although mock jurors
were biased by inadmissible evidence prior to deliberations, the bias was tempered
following deliberation. In their first experiment, the post deliberation jurors disregarded
inadmissible evidence because of due process concerns (that the evidence was obtained
by an illegal search and seizure). The results from the second experiment replicated these
findings, that deliberation lessened the biasing impact of inadmissible evidence. In both
experiments, mock jurors were generally biased by the presentation of such evidence,
however following deliberation, their verdicts were not biased.
However, in contrast to the findings from the aforementioned studies, that
deliberation attenuates extra-legal biases, some researchers have suggested that
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deliberation has no effect on extra-legal variables, with others stating that this process
exacerbates extra-legal biases. A review of these is presented next.
Kramer et al. (1990) performed a study examining the effectiveness of three
remedies (judicial instructions, deliberation, and continuance) to combat biases on juror
judgements caused by pretrial publicity, by examining verdicts given pre and post
deliberation. Results indicated that neither instructions nor deliberation reduced the
impact of either form of publicity (factual or emotional) and that a continuance had a
small effect most likely attributed to the jurors' forgetting information. Admonitions
from the judge to ignore all publicity had no effect on juror or jury verdicts, nor were
instructed juries more likely to contest references to pretrial publicity during jury
deliberation, than non-instructed juries. With regards to deliberation, this process
initially appeared to have served its remedial function, as pretrial publicity was
mentioned infrequently during deliberation, and was usually in a cursory manner.
Furthermore, reminders from other jurors that it should not be considered almost always
accompanied such comments. However, when comparing the pre and post deliberation
verdicts, results displayed that neither instructions nor deliberation had any remedial
effect on this bias, and deliberation in fact actually strengthened publicity biases. Kramer
and colleagues suggested that exposure to such a bias probably affects the actual
deliberation process, as the prejudicial pretrial publicity may create a bias in the selection
or presentation of arguments during deliberation. For example, the publicity may have
led jurors to have a negative impression of the defendant, so jurors may have been less
willing to be his defenders in the jury. In addition, very emotional publicity was also
demonstrated to reduce the jurors' confidence of their verdict, which may also make them
easier to persuade by other jurors' (Kramer et al., 1990).
Results from MacCoun ( 1990) also provide support that extra-legal biases are
exaggerated following the process of deliberation. In a study manipulating the
attractiveness of the defendant, results indicated that the physical attractiveness bias only
influenced post deliberation mock juror and jury judgments. When the defendant was
attractive, there was a shift in judgments toward acquittal, but when the defendant was
unattractive, there was no such shift. As a result, mock juries were more likely to acquit
the attractive defendant than the unattractive defendant. As prior research demonstrates
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that a shift toward acquittal is the modal pattern during deliberation in many criminal
cases (MacCoun & Kerr, 1 988), MacCoun ( 1990) suggested that the unattractive
defendant did not receive the benefit of the doubt that is usually granted to criminal
defendants.
More recently, Steblay, Besirevic, Fulero & Jimenez-Lorente ( 1 999) conducted a
meta-analysis of 44 empirical tests representing 5,755 participants on the effects of pre
trial publicity on juror verdicts. Results indicated that a significant impact of pre-trial
publicity on juror judgements was identified at three points in time; at pre-trial
( contradicting the presumption of innocence until proven guilty); at post-trial, but before
deliberation; and at the post-deliberation verdict. Therefore, the data from such studies
supported the existence of continued pre-trial publicity effects despite the jurors having
deliberated. In support of this finding, Greene et al. ( 1 999) also found that the process of
deliberation caused an increase in jurors' biases in a study investigating the effects of
injury severity on jury negligence decisions. According to the laws of negligence, jurors'
liability decisions are to be influenced by the defendant's conduct, but not by the severity
of the plaintiffs injuries. Results indicated that while the defendant's conduct had a
strong impact on liability judgements, evidence related to injury severity also had a small
effect. Furthermore, it was found that deliberations were of no benefit in reducing the
effects of this bias, and injury severity influenced juror decisions even more so after they
had deliberated, in contrast to the influence prior to deliberating. Greene et al. ( 1999)
suggested that the jurors may not realise that they are using outcome information (injury
severity) to judge the defendant's liability, and when they hear fellow jurors referring to
this evidence during deliberation, they may do a poor job of monitoring themselves to
ignore such information.
Overall, research investigating the impact of deliberation and group discussion on
the effects of extra-legal biases is inconsistent, with support demonstrated for both the
reduction and exaggeration of such biases. Moreover, the degree to which the
deliberation process reduces or amplifies salient extra-legal biases, such as victim race,
has not yet been investigated prior to the current study.
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Summary of the Review on Jury Decision-Making
The four themes that emerged from the literature on jury decision-making indicate
that flaws within the jury system are abundant. In addition, findings from the reviewed
research suggest that jurors do not make decisions as the courts intend them to. Instead
jurors decisions are commonly influenced by stereotypes, schemas and scripts, as well as
extra-legal variables, one of these being the race of the victim. Furthermore, jurors'
decisions may also be influenced by their own attitudes and values, personality, and
demographic similarity to the trial participants. Research also indicates that in cases
where the evidence is weak or ambiguous, a jurors' tendency to rely on extraneous,
biasing factors that they are either instructed to ignore, or are prohibited from using to
make their decision, greatly increases. Finally, the process of deliberation also influences
the outcome of the jury. The style of deliberation, whether verdict or evidence-driven, as
well as the actual processes involved in deliberation, affect not only the outcome of the
jury, but may also affect the influence of extra-legal variables on decision-making.
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN JURY STUDIES
Jury decision-making has been heavily researched and criticised in the last few
decades, with many critiques focussing upon the research designs of such studies, and the
subsequent validity of their findings. The most common methodological issues include an
inadequate sample of participants, the use of inappropriate dependent measures, the poor
presentation of trial information, and a lack of standard jury instructions or jury
deliberation. In addition, the demographic composition and the size of the mock jury can
also limit the findings ofjury research. Finally, a critique of the comparison between
decisions made by mock jurors and real jurors is often made. Each of these issues will be
discussed next.
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Participant Sample
Most studies investigating jury decision-making have included samples comprised
of university student populations (Bagby et al., 1 994; Davis et al., 1 984; Davis, Au,
Hulbert, Chen & Zarnoth, 1 997). The use of students has come under much criticism as
they form a relatively homogeneous group and are not representative of the population
that comprises an actual jury. Dillehay and Nietzel ( 1 980, cited in Bagby et al., 1 994)
point out that the characteristics of students relative to the public at large, would probably
render them less likely to convict. In addition, Sears ( 1 986) identified a number of
attributes of college students that illustrate the hazards of using them in studies requiring
cognitive tasks or in situations involving conformity pressures. In particular, the students
were more susceptible to normative pressures, especially from peers, and were more
accomplished at cognitive tasks than members of the general population. As a result,
simulations using students as mock jurors may lead to an overestimation of the ability of
jurors to handle complex trial testimony or instructions, and the power of an initial
majority to produce a unanimous verdict (Diamond, 1 997). In addition, Pfeifer & Ogloff
( 1 99 1 ) state that students are more likely to pay more attention to details in the
simulation, and understand jury instructions better than non-students. Kaplan and Simon
( 1 972) also point out that students may represent a personality component not
generalisable to the composition of actual juries, which could affect guilt ratings over
stereotypical variables, such that students are less likely to fall victim to stereotypes and
labels. Differences between standard jury members and students would likely therefore
limit the generalisability of many studies.
Dependent Measures
A number of studies investigating jury decision-making have also been criticised
for using inappropriate dependent variables, such as mock jurors' sentence
recommendations for defendants (Gordon, 1 990; Guilfoyle, 2002). While data gathered
from mock jurors' sentence recommendations have little direct application in Western
Australia, as juries do not recommend sentences (Juries Act 1 957), research demonstrates
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that sentence recommendations can provide a valid measure of prejudice (Gordon, 1990).
In a study investigating the effect of prejudice on guilt ratings, Gordon (1990) found a
significant main effect for race on sentence recommendations. Guilfoyle (2002) also
found that sentence recommendations (measured in years) varied as a condition of the
perpetrator's identity in a rape context, with Indigenous Australian perpetrators receiving
greater sentences than those who were Asian, white Australian or Ethnic. Therefore,
while some critics assert that sentence recommendations are inappropriate dependent
measures in jury decision-making research, the literature demonstrates that they can
however, inform us about general attitudes to crime, particular races, and the prejudice
that arises from these.
Presentation of Trial Information
A literature review examining different methods of trial presentation in mock jury
studies, conducted by Devine et al. (2001), identified that studies completed in the 1970's
and early 1980's lacked elements of mundane realism (e.g., visual media), and instead
relied heavily on the written presentation of trial information. Since 1985 however, most
studies have used audiotaped or videotaped stimulus materials, or a combination of the
two (Devine et al., 2001). In a study investigating the ecological validity ofjury
simulations, Bornstein (1999) found very few differences between the written, audio and
video presentation of trial information. However, it was noted that the courts do not
welcome psycholegal research findings when they derive from methods that are not
realistic or representative of the actual legal processes. Therefore, it was recommended
that research is conducted with more representative and realistic methods, including the
use of videotaped trials (Bornstein, 1999).
Jury Instructions
Early studies investigating jury decision-making have been criticised for
neglecting to provide mock jurors with standard jury instructions that specify the
conditions required to find a defendant guilty (Bernard, 1979; Field, 1979). Not only are
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these studies limited by neglecting to provide legally relevant variables into their research
design, but they also fail to consider the effect ofjudicial instructions on prejudicial
biases (Rector et al., 1992). Pfeifer and Ogloff ( 1988, cited in Rector et al., 1992) found
dramatic differences between mock jurors who received standard jury instructions and
those who did not. Results from Pfeifer and Ogloff indicated that although jurors may
have prejudicial attitudes regarding a minority person's guilt, they were reluctant to
endorse these attitudes when they were given jury instructions to guide their decision 
making. These results were later replicated by Pfeifer and Ogloff ( 1 991) who found that
the tendency for participants to rate a black defendant as guiltier than a white defendant,
disappeared when participants were provided with jury instructions. A study by Rector
et al. ( 1992) also supports the contention that applying jury instructions affects jurors'
perceptions of the defendant, victim and incidence of guilty verdicts. Results from this
study indicated that jurors weigh the factors of a case more closely when provided with
jury instructions. When the judge's instructions were absent, the jurors' decisions
appeared to be influenced more directly by the physical characteristics of the defendant,
including their race. Therefore, it seems crucial that jury instructions are included in the
research design.
Research also indicates that the comprehensibility ofjury instructions is an
important factor in jury decision-making (Lieberman & Sales, 1997). In particular, the
literature indicates that jury instructions are often difficult for lay persons to understand
and apply, often attributed to the convoluted and legalistic language of the instructions
themselves (Lynch & Haney, 2000). Lieberman and Sales (1997) found that jurors often
do not remember, understand or apply the judges' instructions correctly. Hastie, Schkade
& Payne (1998) found very low levels of comprehension and memory for information
conveyed in instructions on the law. More recently, Lynch and Haney (2000)
investigated instructional comprehension and found that participants encountered
significant difficulties comprehending the judicial instructions that were intended to
guide them, indicating a serious problem with the judge's instructions is evident.
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Deliberation
Research studies investigating jury decision-making that neglect to use group
deliberation in their study, and instead rely solely on juror's individual judgments have
also been criticised (Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994; Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991). By failing to
incorporate a deliberation period, the study's applicability to the field oflaw where
deliberation is an important part of the process is limited (Pfeifer & Ogloff, 1991). In
addition, Kerwin and Shaffer (1994) state that by using only individual judgements, the
research ignores the critical role of discourse in verdicts. Furthermore Kerwin & Shaffer
found that mock juries that participated in deliberation were more likely to follow judicial
instructions and ignore inadmissible testimony than those asked to render a decision
individually without deliberation. As a whole, these results indicate the value of testing
the impact of deliberations on jury verdicts. In addition, it appears crucial that any study
utilising a mock jury that wishes to be generalised to real world situations should employ
a deliberation period.
The Size of the Jury
Research has also investigated differences in the decision-making process of
juries of different sizes. An early study by Kerr and MacCoun ( 1985) investigated the
effects ofjury size on the process and product of deliberation, by comparing juries with
3, 6 and 12 individuals. Results indicated that as group size increased, the observed
probability of a hung jury increased significantly. Furthermore, while no process
differences were observed between 6 and 12 person groups, juries with 3 people
exhibited several process differences from the larger groups. More recently, Saks and
Marti (1997) completed a meta-analysis to assess the effects ofjury size on deliberation
outcomes using 17 studies comparing 6 and 12 person juries. Results indicated that
larger juries took longer to deliberate, were more likely to include an individual from an
ethnic minority, and were hung more often. However, they were no more likely to arrive
at the correct verdict, ( defined by the preference of the majority of individuals in the
population), than were smaller juries. Smaller juries on the other hand, took less time to
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reach a verdict and participation was greater and more variable. Davis et al. (1997)
examined the effect ofjury size on damage awards in mock civil juries and also found
that 6-person juries took less time to reach a verdict and awarded larger damages than 12person juries and were also more variable in their awards. In contrast to these findings,
an earlier study by Saks ( 1996) concluded that juries should include no less than 12
individuals, as a reduction in this number adversely affects the quality of deliberation. In
particular, the author stated that the reliability of the jury's fact finding, the verdict ratio,
and the vulnerability ofjurors in the minority to conform to pressure by jurors in the
majority, were difficulties encountered by smaller juries.
In summary, studies investigating process differences between juries of different
sizes demonstrate varying results. It appears that smaller juries not only reach a verdict or
decision faster than larger juries, but foster more participation from group members. It is
clear that more research is required to determine the true impact of having smaller
numbers ofjurors than the standard 12 members.
Mock Jurors versus Actual Jurors
Due to legal and practical constraints, in addition to the privacy laws governing
jury deliberation and discussions, the majority ofresearch investigating jury decision
making has been conducted on mock juries in simulated trials (Hastie, 1993). More
recently, however researchers in the United States have been conducting investigations
using actual jurors and juries (Devine et al., 2001). Both mock and real forms ofjury
research have obvious limitations including the lack of generalisability to actual juries for
the former, and an inability to control and manipulate multiple variables for the latter.
For these reasons, the comparisons made between decisions made by mock jurors and
actual jurors is often criticised. Research demonstrates that a number of factors that
affect actual jurors are unlikely to affect mock jurors, making their comparison
questionable (Greene et al., 1999). Presumably, jurors in a real case are more motivated
to attend to the trial evidence, to determine the verdict he or she really prefers, to
persuade fellow jurors that the jury verdict is consistent with that preference, and be more
emotionally invested in the case, as opposed to mock jurors (Devine et al., 2001)

35

RATIONALE FOR THE PRESENT STUDY
As the literature demonstrates, jury decision-making has been well researched,
with numerous studies having been conducted in the last 45 years. Results from such
studies clearly indicate that despite efforts to make the practice ofjurors and juries as fair
and accurate as possible according to law, there exist many flaws, including the influence
of extra-legal variables on jury decision-making. Due to Australia's diverse and
multicultural population, individuals presenting before the court often represent a diverse
range of races. In addition, it is well documented that prejudice toward minority groups
has been identified within Australia (Mellor, 2003; Pedersen & Walker, 1997). It is for
these two reasons that race is an important extra-legal variable that requires investigation
within Australia. Unfortunately, the majority of studies investigating race as an extra
legal variable have been conducted in North America. Results from such studies have
indicated that the race of both the defendant and the victim often influence jury decision
making. Due to the dearth of research investigating the effect of characteristics of the
victim, and an abundance of research examining the effect of characteristics of the
defendant and other trial participants, this thesis will examine the race of the victim.
Due to Australia having a dominant Caucasian race, it was assumed that when the
victim is Aboriginal, Asian or of a Middle-Eastern origin, jurors' judgements of the
defendant, crime and the victim will be negatively prejudiced by the victim's race, and
that when the victim is Caucasian, no such prejudice will impact upon the jurors'
decision-making. It was also assumed that deliberation would attenuate the influence of
the extra-legal variable of the victim's race, such that any bias observed in pre
deliberation judgements will be reduced in post-deliberation judgements.
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Method
Participants

Participants were recruited from the Perth metropolitan area via advertisements and
posters placed within community newspapers and shopping centres respectively. The
posters contained information which requested the voluntary participation of persons for
a study investigating juries and the legal system, and made no mention of race. One
hundred and six participants applied to take part in the study, all of whom were selected.
Selection was made according to the criteria set forth for actual jury participation in the
Juries Act of Western Australia (1957). The participants were aged between 18 and 64
years, and the sample was comprised of 47 males and 59 females. Research displays that
the gender composition of the jury may have an effect on decision-making in rape cases
(Fischer, 1 997). Findings from a study by Fischer (1997) indicated that juries that were
composed mostly or entirely of women tended to convict a male defendant more often
than juries with a lower proportion of women. As the current study utilises an attempted
rape trial, participants were randomly assigned to each jury group in an attempt to
prevent this problem from occurring. Table 1 displays the number of males and females
in each jury across the four conditions.
Table 1
Gender Distribution ofMock Jurors across Victim Race Condition

Aboriginal

Asian

Caucasian

Middle-Eastern

Total

Male

7

17

12

11

47

Female

18

13

14

14

59

Total

25

30

26

25

106

An observation of participants indicated that while the majority was of Caucasian
race, the sample also included several individuals from Asian and Middle-Eastern
countries. It was also noted that of the Caucasian individuals, several were originally
from the United Kingdom and the United States. However, it should be noted that all of
these individuals had become Australian citizens and were therefore eligible to
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participate. Research investigating the effect of the demographic composition ofjuries
on their judgements and verdicts has revealed a juror-defendant similarity bias across a
number of studies (Abshire & Bornstein, 2003; Hastie et al., 1 998). For this reason,
mock jurors were randomly allocated to 1 of 1 2 jury groups in an attempt to prevent this
problem from occurring. When participants failed to attend a set jury, they were
randomly placed in another, and the experiment continued as long as the mock jury had
no less than six people. The number of participants in each jury ranged between 7 and
1 2. As previously mentioned, most research investigating jury size indicates that
significant process differences only tend to emerge when members of a jury have fewer
than four individuals, with few differences detected between 6 and 12 person juries (Kerr
& MacCoun, 1985; Saks & Marti, 1997). For this reason, the slight variation in the size
of the juries in the current study should not pose any problems. Participants were not
paid, nor did they receive any inducements for their part in the study.
Research Design and Analysis

The study aimed to investigate whether mock jurors' perceptions of victims, the crime
and the defendant would be different if the victims were of different races, and if
deliberation would change these perceptions. The race of the victim (Aboriginal, Asian,
Caucasian, Middle-Eastern) was manipulated in an experimental design. The participants
were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions, with three juries
allocated to each of the four victim race conditions. All participants engaged in a
deliberation period and their perceptions pre and post deliberation were compared. This
study therefore aimed to investigate the simultaneous effect of two independent variables.
A mixed factorial design was employed with the race of the victim as the between
subjects factor, and deliberation as the within subject factor. The dependent variables,
obtained from a study by Greene et al. (1998), included five variables related to the
victim: Sympathy for the victim, Victim's likeableness, Victim's reliability, Victim's
honesty, and Victim's value to the community. Another three related to the crime:
Seriousness of the crime, Impact of the crime on the victim, and Victim's responsibility
for the crime. Finally, the last two related to the defendant; the Guilt of the defendant,
and a sentence recommendation for the defendant.
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As the researcher aimed to investigate the interaction between a between subjects
variable (race) and a within subjects variable (deliberation), a mixed design analysis of
variance (ANOVA) technique was utilised to analyse the data. A series of 4 x 2
ANOVAs (race x deliberation) were employed across the ten dependent variables.
Despite the use of multiple tests in the analysis of the data, the Bonferroni adjustment
was not applied to the alpha level to reduce the probability of Type 1 errors. Bender and
Lange (2001) state that multiple test adjustments are not strictly required as long as the
research is exploratory in nature and the data is collected with an objective hypothesis.
Due to the limited amount of research performed in the area of the current study, this
research is not only exploratory, but was collected without key hypotheses. Furthermore,
as each test was performed sep arately, and each was measuring a separate construct (each
dependent variable) the correction was deemed unnecessary. Finally, the Tukey's
Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) test and single factor ANOVAs were applied to
perform post-hoc comparisons across each of the means. The effect size, using eta
squared was interpreted using Cohen's (1988) guidelines.
An analysis of the deliberation period for each mock jury was also conducted. As
previously mentioned, research investigating the process and style of deliberation
identified that jurors most often deliberate in one of two ways. The first is to begin with
verdict preferences and discuss evidence relevant to these preferences; the second begins
with a detailed discussion of the evidence and construction of a plausible story of the
case, ending with verdict preferences (Kameda, 1991). In addition, from an analysis of
18 mock juries, Ellsworth (1989) found that the content ofjury deliberation included a
discussion of the facts of the case (evidence), important contested issues (defendant and
witnesses testimony), the law, a call for a vote, and the judge's instructions. This research
was used as a guide in the development of a series of categories that defined particular
topics of conversation, based upon the most frequently discussed themes in these juries
and information from previous research. This classification was checked and refined by a
postgraduate supervisor. Two trained, postgraduate psychology students then coded each
statement made by the jurors into one of the eight categories, and timed the duration of
discussion within each category with a stopwatch, to allow for a comparison between
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juries. Any disagreement in coding was resolved by consensus. The categories are listed
below with a brief description of the types of conversation each comprised.
•

The Defendant: Discussion specific to the defendant, ranging from his appearance,
his testimony, his actions on the night of the crime, and his demeanor/conduct.

•

The Witnesses: Discussion specific to the witnesses (excluding the defendant and
victim), including their demeanor, testimony, conduct, and appearance.

•

The Evidence: Discussion related to the evidence presented during the trial, including
the watch, the jacket, the gag, and the testimony of the witnesses related to the
evidence.

•

The Defendant's Guilt: Discussion specific to the guilt of the defendant, (e.g., Jurors'
polling methods, arguments as to his guilt).

•

The Crime: Discussion specific to the 'crime' itself, or that of attempted rape in
general.

•

Jury Instructions: Discussion related to the instructions given to the jury before
deliberation.

•

The Victim: Discussion specific to the victim, ranging from her appearance, conduct/
demeanor, testimony, and actions on the night of the crime.

•

Non-Specific: Any discussion by members of the jury, which did not meet the criteria
for inclusion in the aforementioned categories.

Instruments
The present study aimed to examine jurors' judgements of the victim, crime and
the defendant as a function of the race of the victim, and the effect of deliberation on such
judgements. No specific instrument could be located which measured these criteria. As
such, a juror decision-making questionnaire was developed for the purpose of this study
(see Appendix A), based on a questionnaire used by Greene et al. ( 1998). In their study,
the impact ofa victim 's character on jurors' judgements of the victim, defendant, crime,
and the survivors, was measured by having participants rate their judgements on a
number of items using a 6-point Likert-scale. Such items included: the weight the
participants attributed to aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the defendant's
likeableness, dangerousness and the chances for rehabilitation; the victims' likeableness,
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decency and value to the community; the compassion the participants felt for survivors;
the impact of the murder on the victim's family; and the severity of the offence. As the
present study similarly aimed to measure the impact ofa characteristic of the victim (her
race, as opposed to her character in the Greene et al. study} on juror judgements of the
victim, defendant and crime, the jury decision-making questionnaire was adapted from
the instrument utilised by Greene and colleagues.
Two versions of the juror decision-making questionnaire were utilised. The first
version was used in the pre-deliberation period and contained nine statements about the
victim, crime and the defendant. These measured five aspects related to the victim: her
honesty, reliability, likeableness, value, and sympathy toward her; three aspects related to
the crime: its impact on the victim, its seriousness and the victim's responsibility for the
crime; one aspect related to the defendant: a rating of his guilt; and finally, a sentence
recommendation (1-10 years). Each of the items were provided in a randomised order
next to a 7-point Likert scale, and with the exception of the victim's responsibility, were
anchored by strongly disagree (value of l } to strongly agree (value of7). For the item
regarding the responsibility of the victim, the anchor ranged from not responsible at all
(value of 1) to very responsible (value of 7). The second version of the questionnaire was
used in the post-deliberation period and contained the same nine statements and scales.
The statements were placed in a different order however, to ensure that participants did
not simply recall and repeat their responses to the first questionnaire. The third
questionnaire, also completed post-deliberation, contained two questions to directly
assess the impact of the race of the victim on their own, and other jurors' responses to the
statements on the first two questionnaires. While these included a 7-point Likert scale, a
free response section was also provided so participants could detail the reasons for their
selected option on the scale.
To ensure participants were primed for the race of the victim, and that it was
correctly identified, the questionnaires also contained a boxed off section on the top left
hand comer of the first page titled Administration. This asked participants to list the
victim and defendant's race, the date, and their gender. The latter two details were
included to avoid a focus on the race of the victim and defendant, and ensure that the
administration section appeared as general as possible. An analysis of the participants'
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responses to the victim's race in each condition revealed that all had correctly identified
the victim's race.
Materials
The materials consisted of four videotapes displaying the re-enactment of an
attempted rape court trial. Each videotape was identical with the exception of the
introduction, which described the ethnicity of the victim. This consisted of the statement:
"You are about to watch the re-enactment of a court case describing the attempted rape of
a young Aboriginal/Asian/Caucasian/Middle-Eastern woman." The following scenario
was presented in the videos:
A 24-year-old woman was driving home from work when her car broke down. While
walking to find a phone box to callfor assistance, she was pulled into bushes in a nearby
park. The attacker ripped at her clothes and violently pinned her arms to the ground. A
male bystander walking his dog disturbed the attack, causing the attacker to flee. He
offered to take the victim to the police station, however she was too shaken and asked to
be driven home, but took his phone number should she need a witness. Two weeks later,
the victim was convinced by a friend to report the incident, and called the police who
went with the victim to the scene of the crime. A watch with an inscription, stamp and
broken band was found at the crime scene, which led to the questioning of the accused.
The accused, who presented with an alibi, stated that his watch had been stolen weeks
earlier. The bystander and the victim were unable to formally identify the accused due to
impaired vision on the night of the attack due to poor lighting. Due to the time delay in
the vie tim 's reporting of the incident- no forensic evidence could be obtained.
The transcript was written by the researcher and amended by two lawyers to
enhance both its accuracy and realism. The scenario was specifically designed to be
ambiguous, such that the evidence favoured neither the defendant nor the victim. This
was done in view of findings that extra-legal biases most often emerge in cases of
ambiguity as a lack of strong evidence leads jurors to rely on external information, such
as the characteristics of the defendant or victim (Hymes et al., 1993; Rector et al., 1992).
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The transcript was administered to a total of 40 participants known to the researcher, but
who did not participate in the actual study. Each participant individually read the
transcript and rendered a verdict. An analysis of the jurors' verdicts demonstrated that
they were equally divided in their determination of guilt or innocence, indicating that the
trial and the crime scenario was ambiguous, as designed.
A large room with 12 chairs and desks, a television and a videocassette recorder
was organised. A video camera was used to record the deliberation process. Pens and
paper were also provided for note taking. In Westem Australia, to protect the anonymity
of persons involved in a trial, the general ruling in the Supreme Court is that jurors are
not permitted to take notes. However, this ruling is dependent upon the particular judge
in each trial and taking notes is often permitted to enable jurors to accurately recall
details of evidence. In addition, jurors may also view a limited selection of documents
from the crown and defense, that they may also take notes from. In complex trials,
judges have also been observed to instruct the jurors to take notes during the trial (P.
Calabrese, personal communication, October 8, 2003).
Research investigating the effect ofjuror note-taking on decision-making
indicates that note-takers demonstrate superior cognitive performance and more effective
decision-making over non note-takers (Forster-Lee & Horowitz, 1997). Furthermore, a
study by Heuer and Penrod (1994) which examined juror note-taking in 160 trials fowid
that note-taking takes little time, does not distract jurors from the trial, or produce a
distorted view of the case. Forster-Lee, Horowitz and Bourgeois (1994) similarly fowid
that note-takers performed more competently than non note-takers with the greatest
impact at the encoding stage, indicating that the process of writing notes aids in
comprehension. For these reasons, the researcher permitted the jurors to take notes while
watching the video simulation in the present study.

Procedure
Before commencing any testing, all participants read the information sheet and
signed the consent form. They were then seated at a desk, each of which had an envelope
containing the three questionnaires. Each jury then viewed one of four versions of the
videotape (dependent upon which condition they were placed in), which lasted
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approximately 35 minutes. Following this, participants individually completed the pre
deliberation questionnaire, and placed it back in the envelope. The chairs were then
rearranged so all participants were facing one another for the deliberation period.
The researcher then administered a simplified version ofjury instructions to guide
the jurors in deliberating. In Western Australia, the Supreme Court judges' instructions
to the jury are very detailed and comprehensive, and include details of the evidence
presented by both the crown and the defense, in particular what is ruled admissible and
inadmissible; a statement and definition of the charges against the defendant; and all
related elements of the law (G. Pride, personal communication, October 8, 2003). Due
to the rather simple nature of the scenario presented to the juries in the present study, in
addition to time constraints, the researcher decided to use a simplified version ofjury
instructions that were obtained from a study by MacCoun and Kerr ( 1988). As research
demonstrates that jury instructions are often difficult for lay persons to understand,
remember and apply, those obtained from MacCoun and Kerr (1988) were modified to
improve their comprehensibility, and were as follows:
Before you can find a man guilty of a crime, the prosecution must demonstrate with
evidence that the defendant committed the crime beyond reasonable doubt. If the
evidence suggests to you that it is more likely that the defendant committed the crime,
than not, the law requires you to find him guilty as charged; but ifyou feel that it is more
likely that he is innocent than guilty, the law requires you to find him not guilty. In
summary, you must establish that the defendant is guilty or innocent beyond reasonable
doubt and your verdict shouldfavour the side that has presented the stronger evidence.

Following the administration of the jury instructions, the mock juries were asked to
deliberate regarding the case for a maximum of one hour. This was videotaped with the
participants' consent, for the purpose of analysis. For those juries that neared the one
hour maximum, the researcher informed them when five minutes of deliberation time
remained, upon which it would be terminated. At the conclusion of the deliberation
period, the chairs and desks were returned to their original positions, and each participant
individually completed the two remaining post-deliberation questionnaires. After these
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were returned to their envelopes, the researcher collected them. The participants were
then debriefed regarding the purpose of the study after which they were given the
opportunity to ask questions, and each were thanked for their participation.
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RESULTS
Quantitative Analysis
The requirements of ANOVA are that the data meet two assumptions, namely
normality and homogeneity of variance. While most of the items approached a normal
distribution, a positive and negative skewness were identified for four of the items. For
sympathy towards the victim, the impact of the crime, and the seriousness of the crime,
the distributions were negatively skewed, indicating that the majority of the participants
were very sympathetic to the victim, saw the crime as having a large impact, and the
crime as being very serious. In contrast, the victim's responsibility was positively
skewed, indicating that most participants perceived the victim as not being very
responsible for the crime. Given the nature of the crime in the current study, skewness in
favour of the victim, as identified in this case, is not surprising. This often indicates that
the participants were engaged with the scenario and were on side with the victim.
In addition, as indicated in Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), if there are at least 20 degrees
of freedom for error, the F-test is regarded to be robust against violations of the normality
assumption. The error degrees of freedom in the current study were 102 for all the
factorial ANOVAs and the analyses could therefore be considered robust against
violations of the normality assumption. For this reason, the data were not transformed to
obtain normal distributions.
Tests of homogeneity showed some non-homogeneity of variance and variance
covariance matrices in the variables for reliability, value, seriousness, responsibility and
sentence. However, as cell sizes were close to equal and the higher dispersions were
generally not associated with the smaller sample sizes, except in the case of seriousness
and impact, the risk to Type 1 error was low. Some caution in interpretations is required
for the variables of seriousness and impact.
Preliminary one-way ANOVAs showed no significant differences within each set
of three juries dedicated to one victim's race. The data from the different juries for
victims of each race were then combined in further analyses. Independent t-tests across
each variable at pre and post deliberation showed no significant differences in respect of
the gender of the participants, and data for male and female participants were thus

46

combined. A series of 4 x 2 ANOVAs were then performed for the different
questionnaire items - Victim: honesty, reliability, likeableness, sympathy, value; Crime:
responsibility, seriousness, impact; and Defendant: sentence, and guilt. Cell means and
standard deviations are displayed in Table 2 alongside an indication of significant effects.
Table 3 displays the details of the ANOVA results.
The Victim
As shown in Table 2, deliberation had a significant main effect on juror's
judgements of the victim's character. Pre and post analyses showed that regardless of
their race, the victim was seen as more reliable (M = 4.93 versus M = 5 .29), and likeable
(M = 4.98 and M = 5.30) after deliberation. There was also more sympathy for the
victim after the jury deliberation (M = 5.90 and M = 6. 1 8 respectively). The deliberation
effect approached significance for ratings of the victim's honesty (p = .05 1) with victims
being seen as more honest post deliberation. However, the effect size as measured by eta
squared was relatively small for all the judgements of the victim's character. The
proportion of variance in the scores accounted for by deliberation was 1.4% for sympathy
towards the victim, and 2% for both victim's likeableness and reliability.
The Crime
The effects of the victim's race congregated about the crime rather than the victim
per se. In respect of the seriousness of the crime, the effect for race approached
significance (p = .053). The crime was perceived as most serious when involving a
Caucasian victim (M = 6.60) and declining for the Asian (M = 6.50) and Aboriginal
victims (M= 6.44). Participants viewed the crime as least serious when the victim was
Middle-Eastern (M = 6.02).
In respect of the judgements of the victim's responsibility, there was a significant
interaction between the victim's race and deliberation. This is illustrated in Figure 1 . on
p. 47. However, at less than 1 %, the effect size was small.
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Table 2
Mean Scores and Standard Deviations ofJudgements of Victim, Crime and Defendant as a
Function of Victim Race and Deliberation
Aboriginal
Item
Honest
Pre
Post
Reliable
Pre
Post
Likeable
Pre
Post
Sympathy
Pre
Post
Valuable
Pre
Post
Responsible
Pre
Post
Serious
Pre
Post
Impact
Pre
Post
Guilt
Pre
Post
Sentence
Pre
Post

M

SD

Asian
M

SD

Caucasian
M

Middle-Eastern

Total

SD

M

SD

M

SD

Effect

Victim
5.56
5.92

1 . 12
1 .32

5.43
5.80

1 .33
1 .30

5.42
5.54

0.94
1 .30

5.40
5.44

0.82
1 .00

5.45
5.68

1 .07
1 .24

5.08
5.36

1 .08
1 .18

5.13
5.53

1 .33
1 .30

4.69
5.1 1

1 .40
1 .34

4.80
5.12

1.15
0.88

4.93
5.29

1 .25
1 .19

D*

5.28
5.64

1 .02
1 .08

4.63
5.07

1 .27
1.17

5.04
5.23

1.15
1 .21

5.04
5.32

1 .06
0.99

4.98
5.30

1 . 14
1.12

D*

6.00
6.44

1.16
1.12

5.97
6.27

1.13
1 .39

5.8 1
6.04

1 .33
1.18

5.80
5.96

1 .08
0.93

5.90
6. 1 8

1 .16
1.18

D*

5.96
6.04

0.98
0.98

5.37
5.60

1 .42
1 .22

5.31
5.27

1 .49
1 .34

5.24
5.72

1 .09
1.17

5.46
5.65

1 .29
1 .20

Crime
1 .36
1 .56

0.91
1 .36

2.07
1 .67

1 .39
0.88

1 .88
2.38

1 .28
1 .55

1 .64
1 .76

0.91
1.13

1 .75
1 .84

1.17
1 .26

6.52
6.36

0.65
1 .29

6.40
6.60

0.8 1
0.89

6.58
6.62

0.64
0.80

5.92
6. 1 2

1.19
1.13

6.36
6.44

0.87
1 .04

5.88
6.04

1.17
0.94

5.60
5.80

1 .52
1 . 16

5 .65
5.65

1 .06
1 .06

5.64
5 .84

1 .26
1.18

5.69
5.83

1 .26
1 .08

D X R*

Defendant
3.92
3.44

1 .55
1 .56

3 .67
3.37

1 .77
1 .99

3.62
3.37

1 .65
1 .99

3.04
2.40

1 .54
1 .47

3.56
3.13

1 .64
1 .80

D*

4.36
3.96

4. 1 0
4.20

3.27
3.67

3.60
4.00

4.85
3.42

3.71
3.94

1 .44
0.92

2.24
1 .89

3.48
3.03

3.67
3.80

D X R*

Note. Pre and Post indicate pre and post deliberation judgements with the main effect for deliberation represented in

the Total column. The sentence recommendation ranged from 1 - 1 0 years. All other judgements on a 7-point Likert
scale (generally 1 = Strongly Disagree to 7 = Strongly Agree, but for question about victim's responsibility 1 = Not
Responsible at all to 7 = Extremely Responsible). X = Interaction. D = Deliberation. R = Race.
* p < 0.05.
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Table 3
Analysis of Variance for Judgements ofthe Victim, Crime and Defendant across Victim
Race and Deliberation
Item

df

F

p

3

0.50
3.89
0.56

.680
.051
.640

0.99
9.58
0.08

.397
.003*
.969

1 .60
12.78
0.36

. 1 94
.001 *
.783

0.60
7.25
0.3 1

.61 5
.008*
.819

1.94
3.08

3

1 .04

.127
.082
.377

3

1 .86
0.87
2.97

.140
.353
.036*

2.65
0.05
0.68

.053
.499
.564

3

0.43
1 .70
0.19

.734
. 1 96
.899

3
1
3

2.07
7.12
0.21

. 1 09
.009*
.886

3
1
3

1 .70
0.93
4.14

. 1 79
.341
.Oi l *

Victim
Honest
Race
Deliberation
Race x Deliberation
Reliable
Race
Deliberation
Race x Deliberation
Likeable
Race
Deliberation
Race x Deliberation
Sympathy
Race
Deliberation
Race x Deliberation
Valuable
Race
Deliberation
Race x Deliberation

I

3
3
I

3
3
I

3
3
I

3
3
I

Crime
Responsible
Race
Deliberation
Race x Deliberation
Serious
Race
Deliberation
Race x Deliberation
Impact
Race
Deliberation
Race x Deliberation

I

3
3
I

3
3
I

Defendant
Guilt
Race
Deliberation
Race x Deliberation
Sentence
Race
Deliberation
Race x Deliberation

Note. The degrees of freedom for the between subject and within subject error is 102.
*p < 0. 05.
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2.4

� 2.2

·w

2.0

·5

I

,

1 .8
1 .6
1 .4
1 .2
Aboriginal

O pre deliberation
0 post deliberation
Asian

Caucasian

Mddle-Eastern

Race of victim

Figu.re 1. Jurors ' j udgements of victim s res ponsibili ty as a function of victim race and
deliberation ( 1 = not responsible at all , 7 = extremely responsible) .
Post-hoc analyses using Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference ( HSD) tests
howed no sign ificant differences in the assi gned resp onsibility for the victims of
different race at either pre or post del iberation. The simp le effects of del iberation were
investigated by means of sin g le factor ANOVAs. The deliberation effect approached
significance for the Caucasian victim (p = .056) , with higher res ponsibili ty assi gn ed to
the victim post del iberation. However, the onl y significant difference in the p re and p ost
del iberation assignment of responsibility was for the Asian victim , F ( 1 ,29 ) = 6.00 ,

p < .05. The Asian victim was assi gned significantly less responsibility (M= 1 .67) after
deliberation , than before (M = 2.07).
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The Defendant
As shown in Table 2, deliberation had a ignificant main effect on j w-ors'
j udgement of the defendant's gui lt. A comparison of pre and post deliberation scores
illustrate that after deliberation, the participants ratings of the defendant' guilt were
lower (M = 3 .56 and M = 3 . 1 3 respectively). However at 1 .6%, the effect size was small.
In respect of the length of the sentence a signed to the defendant, there was a
ignificant interaction between the victim' race and deliberation but, at less than I %, the
effect size wa

mall. The interaction i illustrated in Figure 2. Figure 2 demon trate

that the defendant's sentence was decreased after deliberation for all but the Asian group.

s ------------------,
5
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,

,GI\

\

\

\
\

\

'

\

\

\

.
0 pre defiberation

0 post deliberation
0 -----��----�-----Mddle- Eastem
Aboriginal
Asian
Caucasian

Race of victim

Figure 2. Juror's judgement of defendant'

entence as a function of victim race and

deliberation.
Po t-hoc Tukey' HSD tests showed no significant differences in the sentence
a igned for victims of different race at either pre or post deliberation. The simple effects
of deliberation were investigated by means of single factor ANOVA , which indicated a
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significant effect for the length of sentence for the Caucasian victim only, F (1,16) =
4.92, p < .05. In the case of the Caucasian victim, there was a significant decrease in the
length of sentence assigned to the defendant from pre deliberation (M = 6.41) to post
deliberation (M = 5.24).
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Qualitative Analy is
Preliminary analy es of the di cu ion in each deliberation period aero

the four

conditions, demonstrated large differences regarding both the topics of discu sion and tbe
time dedicated to each. The content of the discu sion was coded into eight set categorie ,
namely: the victim, defendant witne e ', evidence, guilt, the crime, jury instructions and
a non- pecific category. Each category was quantified as a percentage of tbe total
deliberation period for tbat j ury, to repre ent the amount of time dedicated to di cussing
that topic. This allowed a compari on aero

the different race conditions to be

conducted. These results are di played in Figure 3 .

1 00%
90%
80%

a on-specific
• Instructions

70%
60%

Crime
• Guilt
O Evidence
O Witnesses
• Defendant

50%
40%
30%

Victim

20%
1 0%
0%
Aboriginal

Asian

Caucasian

Middle.Eastern

Figure 3. Percentage of time pent di cu ing specific categories during deliberation
aero

the four race conditions.
As Figure 3 demonstrate , a di cu ion of tbe evidence presented during the trial

(in particular tbe watch, eyewitness accounts of the perpetrator, and the victim' s clothes)
constituted the mo t izeable proportion across all four conditions during the deliberation
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periods. Discussion of the categories ofjury instructions, the crime, the witnesses, and
the defendant were fairly uniform across the four conditions with no major discrepancies
noted. The most noteable differences between the deliberations for each condition
included the time dedicated to non-specific comments, discussion of the defendant's guilt,
and of the victim. Juries in the Middle-Eastern condition spent very little time discussing
the defendant's guilt, in comparison to the other juries. In addition, while most juries
spent very little time discussing non-specific information, this constituted a sizeable
proportion of discussion time in the Aboriginal condition. Finally, discussion of the
victim constituted a small proportion of discussion in the Middle-Eastern and Caucasian
conditions, a lesser amount in the Aboriginal condition, and with no mention of the
victim in deliberations for the Asian condition. Further analyses of the discussions within
the jury groups, in particular the topic of the victim, support the quantified findings with
reference to the race of the victims.
Aboriginal Victim Condition
Discussions by the jurors in the Aboriginal victim condition demonstrated that
they held a sympathetic view of the victim, with particular reference to her being the
victim of an assault. This is illustrated in the following excerpt.
Jury 1 : Aboriginal Victim Condition
IA: "It makes it hard that she didn 't comeforward earlier to the police. "
IB: "Yeah, she threw away her clothes and everything ... got rid of all the evidence. "
I C: "And she washed herself, everything. But that 's such a natural reaction
though ... after all that she's been through. "
IB: "Yeah, I think it's been proven that when you're assaulted, you feel ashamed and
embarrassed about the whole act ... that 's why victims don 't report it. "
I A: "And her reasoning behind it all, that she didn 't want to worry her parents and she
felt awfal... that 's understandable. !feel that in her mind, she can't put it out ofher head,
this assault. "
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Jurors also expressed sympathy toward the victim with direct reference to her
race. As the following excerpt demonstrates, the discussion included that Aborigines
have a difficult experience in Australian society and as such, the victim may not have felt
comfortable in reporting the crime to the police. Furthermore, a closer analysis of the
deliberation suggests that participants may have felt somewhat uncomfortable discussing
the victim's race. This was indicated by some participants promptly changing the topic
of the victim's race to that of her reaction to the crime, and her gender. When her race
was mentioned for a second time, the same pattern emerged with the topic changed by a
juror to that of the male witness.
Jury 2 : Aboriginal Victim Condition
2A - "I really wonder why she didn 't go to the police, maybe because she is an
Aboriginal and she... '
2B - (interrupts) "Yes, and she 'd have to answer more questions. "
2A - "Yes, more questions, and she knows that she 's going to be blamedfor it, and
everybody there, they 're all white, the police, the witness, they 're all white ... "
2C - (interrupts) "But I think that 's quite common regardless of her race, she was in
shock, and she wouldjust want to go home first. "
2B - "It shouldn 't matter that she 's Aboriginal, any girl,

ifit happened to them, they 're

scared because its always said that they are to blame. "
2CIE - "Yeah, yeah "

ifI was an Aboriginal, I wouldn 't go to the police. "
"Just beingfemale, they won 't believe you. More so ifyou 're an Aboriginal, butjust

2A - " But I'd have to say,
2E -

beingfemale, those issues are there. "
2C - " Yes, but even in the condition that she was, she wouldn 't be in the position to
answer all the questions they 'd want to ask her. "
2D - "What did everyone think about the man who was the witness? " 7 (Subject
changes to witness).

The jurors' sympathetic view toward the Aboriginal victim as displayed in the
above analysis, was also demonstrated in several trends observed in the quantitative
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analysis, which did not reach significance. When the victim was Aboriginal, participants
rated the defendant as guiltier (M = 3.68) than defendants in the Asian (M = 3.52),
Caucasian (M = 3.44) and Middle-Eastern (M = 2.72) conditions; and the crime as having
a larger impact (M = 5.96) on the Aboriginal victim, than the Asian (M = 5.70),
Caucasian (M = 5.65) and Middle-Eastern (M = 5.74) victims.
Participants also had more sympathy for the victim when they were Aboriginal
(M = 6.22), compared to the Asian (M = 6.12), Caucasian (M = 5.92) and Middle-Eastern
(M = 5.88) victims; and rated them as more likeable (M = 5.46) than the Asian, Caucasian
and Middle-Eastern victims (means of 4.85, 5.13 and 5.18 respectively). Aboriginal
victims were also perceived as more honest (M = 5.74) than the Asian, Caucasian and
Middle-Eastern victims, (M = 5.62, 5.48, 5.42); and as more valuable to the community
(M = 6.00) than the Asian (M = 5.48), Caucasian (M = 5.29) and Middle-Eastern
(M = 5.48) victims. In addition, the defendants also received the longest sentences when
the victims were Aboriginal (M = 4.16) and Caucasian (M = 4. 13) with shorter sentences
assigned to defendants when the victims were Asian (M = 3.47) and Middle-Eastern

(M= 1. 18).

In addition, the open ended responses on the questionnaires demonstrated similar

themes about potential stereotyping experienced by this group as well as a sympathetic
attitude by jurors: "The victim did not go immediately to the police to report the assault
because being Aboriginal, she may not have been treated as a totally reliable witness and
would probably have been met with prejudice " (Juror 2E).

Asian Victim Condition
Analyses of the jurors' discussion during the deliberation period failed to find any
mention of race, stereotypes or culture for victims in the Asian conditions. In addition,
jurors in all three Asian victim conditions neglected to mention the victim at all. Instead,
the discussion tended to focus mainly on the evidence, as displayed in the next excerpt.
Jury 11: Asian Victim Condition
1 lA - "He may be guilty, but there'sjust not enough evidence. "
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l JB - "And it has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. "
I JD - ! mean, that's right, you can't say that he's guilty just because of his height
11

either. "
I IA - "Well, there's two or threejurors in this room that are that size too, it 's probably
the size of5 0% ofmen in this country. "
11 C - "His alibi seems ok though, but... "
l JB - " Well his roommate could be lyingfor him, don't forget that. "
I JD - "Regardless, you can't find him guilty over that. "
The finding that the Asian victim was not mentioned at all is interesting, given that a
significant finding was obtained in the quantitative analysis with regard to the victim's
responsibility for the crime. After deliberation, the Asian victim was found to be
significantly less responsible than before deliberation.
Caucasian Victim Condition
Qualitative analyses of the deliberation periods for the Caucasian condition
indicated that a large proportion of time was dedicated to discussing the defendant's guilt,
the evidence and the victim. Interestingly, more time was spent discussing the victim
than the defendant in this condition. As expected, jurors neglected to mention the race of
the victim, a likely outcome when the victim is from the dominant race. Being part of the
dominant race may also explain the elevated perception of the seriousness of the crime
for the Caucasian victim condition, as found in the quantitative analysis. When
discussing the victim, the discussion generally focussed on the victim's credibility and
reliability. For example:
Jury 8 : Caucasian Victim Condition
BA: "Is there a question about the victim's integrity? "
BB: "Well, I believe she had a reason t o report the crime. I mean, her car broke down
and presumably this was true and the witness did drive her home. She had no reason to
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just be driving along and report a rape. Ifyou got assaulted, you'd report it wouldn 't
you? "
8A: "I don 't know. I know people that would report i t and some that wouldn 't. "
8C: "Its understandable that some young women would not want to report it, and would
just want to hide it. "
8D: "Well, what about how she threw the ripped clothes into the bin. Why would someone
do that. I don 't get it. "
8A: "So is there a question about her.. ? "
8B: "I think she did break down in her car. "
8C: "And she was all tousled and her clothes were ripped, the witness said. "
8D: "That 's right. And he found her, so it seems that it did happen. "
8B: "Yeah, she had a witness and everything. "
Jury 9: Caucasian Victim Condition
9A: "The attack did actually happen though, didn 't it? "
9B: "What? That doesn 't matter. "
9A: "! know, but ... how do you know? We don 't know ifshe may have made it up. "

9C: "Maybe ifshe reported it straight away there would be more evidence and they may
have caught the guy. "
While jurors appeared evenly distributed in their attitudes regarding the reliability
and credibility of the Caucasian victim, the quantitative findings demonstrate interesting
results. While several non-significant trends indicate that many individuals were critical
of the victim, these results are in opposition to the finding that the crime was perceived as
most serious for this victim.
A significant decrease in the length of the sentence assigned to the defendant was
evident after deliberation, and while not significant, the Caucasian victim was also
viewed as more responsible for the crime (M = 2.13), than the Aboriginal (M = 1.46),
Asian (M = 1.87), and Middle-Eastern (M = 1.70) victims. In addition, other trends
identified in the quantitative analysis that were not significant included that the Caucasian
victim was perceived as the least reliable (M = 4.90) compared to the Aboriginal

58

(M = 5.22), Asian (M = 5.33) and Middle-Eastern (M = 4.96) victims'. Furthermore, the
Caucasian victim was viewed as the least valuable to the community (M = 5.29),
compared to the Aboriginal (M = 6.00), Asian (M = 5 .48) and Middle-Eastern (M = 5 .48)
victims; and the crime was seen as having the least impact (M = 5 .65), when compared to
the Aboriginal, Asian and Middle-Eastern victims (means of 5.96, 5.70 and 5.74
respectively).
Middle-Eastern Victim Condition
Discussion regarding the Middle-Eastern victim centred on issues of unreliability,
credibility and dishonesty, as demonstrated in the following excerpt of deliberation
between members of Jury 5 (Middle-Eastern condition).
Jury 5 : Middle Eastern Victim Condition
5A: "Now, letsjust talk about something here, can !just ask.... Is she lying? I mean, was
she even attacked at all? "
5B: "Definitely .... Yes, she was attacked. "
5C: "Well, she sounded credible, I think she was reliable ... "
5B: "No, she's telling the truth I think, I mean ... who knows. "
5A: "Exactly, it's hard to be sure. We don 't know ifshe's telling the truth or not. "
It was also apparent that while some jurors were keen to discuss the victim's race,
certain jurors were averse to such discussions; preferring to change the topic to a more
relevant theme. The next excerpt demonstrates how the jurors' discussion underwent
several topic changes. It was evident that topics regarding the victim's morals and her
race were avoided and were challenged as only being assumptions. The conversation
then returned to stereotypical comments regarding the Middle-Eastern race and the
victim's personality, which was again challenged by a juror as being irrelevant, only to
return to the issue of race once again. Issues of reliability, credibility and dishonesty
were also demonstrated.
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Jury 4: Middle-Eastern Victim Condition
4A: "Maybe she'sjust making this whole assault-thing up as she comes from an ethnic
background and she doesn't want her parents to know she 's been sleeping around. "
4B: "Yeah, but that 's an assumption. "
4C: "Her race would come into it, as it would be the only reason she's been so late in
reporting the crime, because culturally, Middle-Eastern womenjust put up and shut up.
They're not gonna report it. There's a lot ofshame there. "
4D: "Yeah, but potentially she could be an introvert as well. "
4B: "Yeah, yeah .... but race aside. "
4E: "Well, being Middle-Eastern though, don't you think it's strange she has a friend that
is male? "
4F: "Letsjust cut to the chase here though, lets talk about the evidence. "
Several trends identified in the participants' responses to the questionnaire items,
which did not reach significance, provide further support to the aforementioned negative
themes of unreliability, low credibility and dishonesty. Participants had the least
sympathy for the Middle-Eastern victim (M = 5.88) compared to the Aboriginal
(M = 6.22), Asian (M = 6.12), and Caucasian victims (M = 5.92); and also saw her as
being the least honest (M = 5.42), compared to the other races (means of 5.74, 5.62, and
5.48 respectively) for the Aboriginal, Asian and Caucasian victims. In addition, the
defendant was seen as least guilty when the victim was Middle-Eastern (M = 2.72)
compared to when the victim was Aboriginal (M= 3.68), Asian (M = 3.5 1), or Caucasian
(M = 3.44).
The trend that participants had the least sympathy for the Middle-Eastern victim,
in addition to perceiving her as the least honest, may account for the lowered perception
of the seriousness of the crime for the Middle-Eastern victim. Furthermore, the trend that
participants perceived the defendant as the least guilty in the Middle-Eastern condition
may account for the lowered sentence for the defendant in the Middle-Eastern condition.
These findings also support the results gathered from the qualitative analyses regarding
the duration of time spent on particular topics during the deliberation period. In the
Middle-Eastern victim condition, the least amount of time was spent discussing the
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defendant's guilt or innocence when compared to the other races. This suggests that the
ratings of his guilt were dependent upon the discussion of other topics, including the
victim, which was a focal point for jurors in this condition.
In addition, it was also noticeable that several jurors assumed that as a Middle
Eastern woman, the victim was automatically of a Muslim religion, highlighting a
stereotype associated with this race. Furthermore, issues regarding the victim's race were
also raised with respect to her version of events during the attack. Again, some
participants resisted discussing the topic of her race and opted to redirect the discussion
to other issues, such as the gender of the victim. This is demonstrated in the following
excerpt.
Jury 4: Middle Eastern Victim Condition
4F: "She said she couldn 't see his face when he was attacking her. Why was that? Maybe
she closed her eyes. "
4E: "She would have had her veil on, which would have obstructed her vision. "
4F: "Butjust because she's ofMiddle-Eastern origin doesn 't mean that she always wears
it, or even wears it at all. "
4C: "And she was working at a restaurant earlier, so she probably wasn 't wearing it. "
4B: "The fact that she's Middle-Eastern is irrelevant here. "
4E: "The only thing her race may have a bearing on is that it took her two weeks to
report the crime. "
4D: "Yeah, but that could happen to anyone, whether you're white, black, orange or
blue. "
4E: "Even blokes,

ifthey're raped, they may act exactly the same. Ifthe victim was male,

he may have also done that. "
Open ended responses on the questionnaires identified different qualities in mock
jurors' attitudes toward the victim, including an understanding of the victim's actions:
"She would be more likely to hide the crime because ofher cultural background" (Juror
4A); and "Muslim women may be more afraid to report the rape as they aren 't allowed
to have sex before marriage, or maybe it was due to shame " (Juror 4G). Other comments
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demonstrated mock jurors' sympathy for the victim: "Some jurors were very sympathetic
as being raped is worse for virgins (unmarried, Muslim women) " (Juror 4A); and "Some
of the jurors were more sympathetic to the victim because ofher cultural background"
(Juror 4E).
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DISCUSSION
The current study investigated whether the race of the victim, and the process of
deliberation, would influence jurors' perceptions and judgements of the defendant, the
victim and the crime. Also of interest was whether an interaction would occur between
the victim's race and deliberation, and in particular, whether deliberation would cause an
attenuation or exaggeration of any racial bias that may exist. As research findings
supported arguments from both sides, the current study was exploratory in nature and
therefore precise directional hypotheses were not made. The findings indicate that jurors'
perceptions and judgements are not formed exclusively by legal, evidential factors, but in
some cases tend to be biased by the victim's race. In addition, deliberation produced an
overall positive impact upon judgements of the victim's character, and appeared to both
attenuate and exaggerate the effect of race as an extra-legal variable with regard to the
defendant's sentence and the victim's responsibility. These findings are discussed in
turn.
Race
While the quantitative investigations failed to produce any significant main
effects for race, the effect for race approached significance with respect to the seriousness
of the crime. In addition, the pattern of results on most of the items revealed a consistent
trend across the different races. While the evaluation of the victim was generally positive,
the pattern of results suggests some racial bias. More specifically, the trends observed
identified an overall positive bias toward the Aboriginal victim, and an overall negative
bias toward the Middle-Eastern victim, and to a lesser extent, the Caucasian victim.
Furthermore, the qualitative findings provide support for this pattern of results. An
analysis of the participants' discussion during the deliberation period, for the Aboriginal
victim included sympathetic views, while discussion regarding the Middle-Eastern and
Caucasian victims focussed upon questioning the victim's reliability, honesty, credibility
and her integrity. Furthermore, discussions in both the Aboriginal and Middle-Eastern
victim conditions included the emergence of stereotypes regarding the victim's races.
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Quantitative Findings
Results from the quantitative analyses revealed that an effect for the victim's race
approached significance with respect to the seriousness of the crime, with the crime
perceived as being the most serious when the victim was Caucasian, as opposed to the
other races. This is an understandable finding considering that the jury was comprised of
a majority of Caucasian members, who one would assume would favour their own race.
Furthermore, the results also indicate a level of prejudice toward the Middle-Eastern
victim, with jurors rating the crime as being the least serious when a Middle-Eastern
woman had been attacked. These findings are in contrast to a North American study by
Foley et al. ( 1996), who found that crimes were perceived as more serious and defendants
were awarded longer sentences when the victim was from a minority race, than when the
victim was white. The difference in results between these two studies may reflect
differences in education and the media with respect to minority races in North America
and Australia, with the possibility that the former promote a greater acceptance and
protection of minority races. An alternative explanation is that due to recent world events
of terrorism linked to Middle-Eastern countries, individuals from Middle-Eastern cultures
are viewed negatively, and thus crimes are viewed as less serious when the victim is of
Middle-Eastern origin. This explanation seems plausible given that Foley et al. 's study
was conducted pre 200 1, while the current study is post 2001, thus close to the September
11 terrorist attacks in the United States.
Observed Patterns and Qualitative Findings
The results from the quantitative analysis revealed a consistent pattern throughout
the data, with a positive bias demonstrated toward the Aboriginal victim, a negative bias
toward the Middle-Eastern victim, and to a lesser extent, the Caucasian victim, and mixed
findings toward the Asian victim. Qualitative analyses of discussion during the
deliberation periods for each of the races supported this pattern. A discussion of each race
follows.
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Australian Aborigines
While no precise directional hypotheses were made regarding mock jurors'
attitudes toward Aborigines, it was assumed due to the salient nature of this race in
today's society, that the Aboriginal victim may be perceived in a negative fashion, and
viewed less favourably when compared to the Caucasian victim. However, results
indicate that the Aboriginal victim was perceived in a more positive light than victims
from the other races were. While not significant, these positive perceptions were
observed in the pattern of the mock jurors' ratings of the victim's honesty, likeableness
and value. In addition, ratings of sympathy for the victim, the impact of the crime, the
defendant's guilt and the victim's responsibility all indicated a positive bias in favour of
the Aboriginal victim.
Overall, the Aboriginal victim was perceived as being the most honest and
likeable, as well as having more value to the community than the other races.
Furthermore, she received the most sympathy when compared to the victims from other
races, and the crime was seen as having the greatest impact. Ratings of the defendant's
guilt in the Aboriginal victim condition were also higher than those found for defendants
in the other conditions. Finally, the results also revealed that the mock jurors viewed the
Aboriginal victim as being the least responsible for the crime.
The finding that mock jurors rated the Aboriginal victim as the most honest was
surprising, and contradicts findings by Willis ( 1 992), who found that black victims in
North America were perceived as less truthful than victims from the dominant race. In
addition, the finding that favourable attitudes were demonstrated toward the Aboriginal
victim contradicts research conducted in Australia examining attitudes and feelings
toward Aborigines (Larsen, 198 1 ; Mellor, 2003; Pedersen et al., 2000). Results from
these studies indicated ongoing negative stereotypes and unfavourable attitudes toward
the Aboriginal race (Larsen, 1981 ), including the finding that Aborigines are among the
most discriminated against in Australian society (Pedersen et al., 2000). Furthermore, in
a recent examination of prejudice and racism in Australia, Mellor (2003) determined that
a significant level of prejudice exists within the general Australian community toward
Aborigines, which is commonly expressed by verbal and physical means.
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In addition, while the pattern of results demonstrated that the defendant in the
Aboriginal victim condition received a stronger guilt rating than defendants in the other
conditions, a study by Dean et al. (2000) displayed opposite findings, with defendants
rated as more likely to be guilty in cases where the victim was white, than when the
victim was from a minority race. Finally, results from Willis ( 1992) demonstrated that
black victims were found to be more responsible for a crime than white victims were.
This finding is in direct contrast to that found in the current study, whereby Aboriginal
victims were perceived as being the least responsible, and Caucasian victims as the most
responsible. While this finding appears to demonstrate prejudice and unfavourable
attitudes toward the Caucasian victim, Guilfoyle and Walker (2002) and Guilfoyle (1998)
suggest that prejudiced attitudes are more likely directed to the race perceived as the least
responsible. Results found in Guilfoyle ( 1998) and Guilfoyle and Walker (2002)
demonstrated the assignment of significant non-responsibility to the low status
Aboriginal victim, when compared to the victim from the dominant race. It was noted by
the authors that this expression may evidence political correctness, and a tendency not to
explicitly state Aborigines as responsible (e.g., not capable of responsibility).
Qualitative analyses of the mock jurors' discussion during the deliberation periods
supported the aforementioned pattern of results, and highlighted several stereotypical
attitudes, judgements and beliefs regarding Aborigines. In particular, stereotypes
discussed by mock jurors portrayed a positive construction of the victim, which centred
on topics including the difficulties Aborigines face in society, the vulnerability of the
Aboriginal race, and expressions of sympathy. Such attitudes may account for the more
favourable ratings given by the mock jurors to the Aboriginal victim. This finding
supports earlier research that jurors often utilise stereotypes when making decisions, and
that this can lead to biases (Devine et al., 2001).
The sympathetic attitude towards the Aboriginal victim observed in the
quantitative data, was also evident in the analysis of the deliberations of the different
juries in this condition. Such sympathetic views were expressed in both the context of
being a victim of an assault in general, as well as with specific reference to the victim's
race. Discussions included that Aborigines have a difficult experience in Australia, and
may not feel comfortable reporting the crime to the police. These views are interesting
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when examined in the context of recent research conducted by Mellor (2003), who
suggested that the police frequently express racism toward Aborigines, through
harassment. As such, jurors' comments regarding the difficulty of Aboriginal individuals
approaching the police may well be founded. Some mock jurors' also stated that the
Aboriginal victim might have felt that had she reported the assault, she would not have
been believed by the police. These perceptions are also credible given research which
states that the victim's perception or realisation that they may not be believed can also
effectively close avenues for reporting and seeking redress, and may possibly lead to their
prolonged victimisation (Viano, 1996). In addition, research from Wyatt (1993, cited in
Viano, 1995) found that black women in North America, expecting a negative and
blaming response from the police and perceiving themselves as devalued by society, are
less likely to report an incident of assault than are white women.
Analyses of the participants' discussions when discussing the Aboriginal victim
indicated that some jurors appeared uncomfortable discussing the victim's race, preferring
to avert the discussion to another subject. Such aversions included either an implicit
expression of discomfort by changing the topic from the victim's race, to topics including
the victim's gender, or the witnesses; or a more explicit statement that such comments
were irrelevant to the discussion at hand. Juror discomfort with the topic of the victim's
race appears to indicate that the participants may either foster racist attitudes that they
cannot express due to society deeming this expression as unacceptable, or an awareness
of the prejudiced attitudes and cultural stereotypes associated with this race.
While no precise directional hypotheses were made, it was assumed given the
nature of the research conducted in Australia on racism and prejudice (Mellor, 2003;
Pedersen & Walker, 1997) that the Aboriginal race would be perceived as less favourable
than the Caucasian race, which was unsupported. As the mock juries in the present study
were comprised of individuals who meet the criteria for actual juries (thus, were assumed
not to be susceptible to the biases and leniency found in student populations), social
desirability and modern racism may have influenced the findings of the present study.
The mock jurors may have suppressed feelings of prejudice and openly expressed
favourable attitudes in an overt avoidance of prejudice and racism so as not to be
negatively evaluated by other mock jurors. This theory is supported by Pedersen and
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Walker ( 1 997) who found that modern prejudice was prevalent in Australia, with more
than one-half of a Perth sample scoring above the midpoint on a measure of modern
prejudice.
Asian
As research conducted in Australia dictates some levels of prejudice toward
individuals from Asian races (Walker, 1 994; Sanson et al., 1998), it was assumed that the
Asian victim would be seen as less favourable than the Caucasian victim, as indicated by
the mock jurors' ratings. However, the pattern of results from the current study only
partially support the findings from Walker ( 1994) and Sanson et al. (1998), with the
Asian victim in the present study being perceived as the least likeable compared to the
other victims, but also viewed as being the most reliable. Analyses of the mock jurors'
discussion during the deliberation periods also failed to reveal any signs of prejudice
toward the Asian victim, with not one mock juror mentioning the victim during
deliberation. Instead, discussions focussed upon the witnesses and the evidence. The
content of such discussions may provide a reason for the finding that the Asian victim's
responsibility for the crime decreased after deliberation, as mock jurors tended to focus
more on details of the crime, than of the victim. In addition, this rating paired with the
lack of discussion regarding the victim during deliberation may also indicate a positive
bias toward the Asian victim.
Caucasian
It was assumed that as part of the dominant race in Australia, the Caucasian
victim would be perceived in a more positive fashion than the other victims, as evidenced
by jurors' ratings of the victim, crime and the defendant. Surprisingly however, a slight
negative bias toward the Caucasian victim was identified in the pattern of quantitative
results across a number of items. In particular, the Caucasian victim was perceived as
being the least valuable and reliable victim compared to victims from the other races, and
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the crime as having the least impact upon her. In addition, the Caucasian victim was
perceived as the most responsible when compared to the other victims.
While the mock jurors' ratings of the victim's value, reliability and impact of the
crime appear to illustrate prejudiced attitudes toward the Caucasian race, the rating of the
Caucasian victim as being the most responsible for the crime may actually indicate a
positive attitude toward her. As previously mentioned, findings from studies by
Guilfoyle ( 1998) and Guilfoyle and Walker (2002) demonstrated that the tendency not to
assign responsibility to individuals may be a form of implicit prejudice, based on a belief
that the victim is not capable of being responsible. Therefore, as the Caucasian victim
was rated as most responsible, results from Guilfoyle ( 1998) suggest that this indicates a
positive attitude toward the victim. However, the fact that mock jurors' rated the same
victim as the least valuable and reliable and the crime as having the least impact upon her
does not support this argument.
Middle-Eastern
Due to recent international and national developments, including crimes
committed by offenders of a Middle-Eastern origin and major terrorist events including
extreme Muslim groups, it was assumed that individuals from Middle-Eastern countries
might emerge as a target for prejudice. The pattern of quantitative results across a
number of items in this study support this assumption, with a slight negative bias
demonstrated toward the Middle-Eastern victim. As the trends in the data displayed, the
Middle-Eastern victim was perceived as the least honest and received the least sympathy
when compared to the other victims. Furthermore, the defendant in the Middle-Eastern
condition was perceived as being the least guilty when compared to the defendants from
the other races.
The finding that the Middle-Eastern victim was perceived as the least honest
supports Willis' (1992) finding that minority victims were perceived as less truthful than
white victims were. Furthermore, the finding that the defendant in the Middle-Eastern
condition was perceived as the least guilty supports findings from Dean et al. (2000),
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which indicated that defendants were perceived as less likely to be guilty when the victim
of a crime was from a minority race, than when they were from the dominant race.
Mock jurors' discussions during the deliberation periods in the Middle-Eastern
condition supports the pattern identified in the quantitative data that indicated a slight
negative bias toward the Middle-Eastern victim. In particular, prejudice was
demonstrated in the expression of stereotypical views of individuals from Middle-Eastern
countries, and a discussion of issues related to sexual intercourse, taboo's associated with
extra-marital sexual behaviour, and the possibility that sexual assault is tolerated by
Middle-Eastern women. The effect of such stereotypes may account for the lower
sentence assigned to the defendant and the reduced seriousness of the crime when the
victim was of a Middle-Eastern origin.
A preoccupation with the victim's race was also demonstrated with respect to the
time dedicated to discussion of the victim in deliberation, when compared to the other
race conditions. Closer analyses of the time dedicated to particular topics during
deliberation revealed that, when compared to jurors' in the other race conditions, jurors in
the Middle-Eastern condition spent very little time discussing the defendant's guilt.
Instead, several mock jurors focussed the discussion on the victim, suggesting that the
victim influenced mock juror' discussions and averted their attention from the question of
the defendant's guilt. When compared to results from the other race conditions, who
spent more time discussing the defendant's guilt, and less discussing the victim, it appears
that this was due to the race of the victim acting as an extra-legal variable, by causing
irrelevant factors (victim's race) to impact upon juror's decision-making process.
In addition, the behaviour of several mock jurors upon mention of the victim's
Middle-Eastern origin appeared to indicate a level of implicit prejudice. More
specifically, a number of mock jurors were noticed to avert the topic of conversation from
the victim's race to other topics. This suggests that participants may foster racist
attitudes, or have a strong awareness of cultural stereotypes with respect to the Middle
Eastern race. As such, discussion of the victim's race may make such jurors
uncomfortable due to an inability to express negative attitudes, as these are deemed
unacceptable by society. Instead, the mock jurors may have tended to increase their
comfort level by averting these topics.
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Deliberation
The main finding to emerge as a result of deliberation was that it produced a
change in mock jurors' judgements of the victim's character, with an overall increased
favourable attitude demonstrated toward each victim post deliberation, regardless of their
race. A leniency bias was also indicated, with mock jurors' giving lower ratings of the
defendant's guilt following deliberation. In addition, deliberation appeared to attenuate
biases observed pre deliberation. In particular, negative biases observed toward the
Asian victim were reduced following deliberation, with the assignment of significantly
less responsibility post deliberation. However, it appeared that biases stemming from the
victim's race were also exaggerated after deliberation, with respect to the victim's
responsibility for the crime and the defendant's sentence. Though not significant, the
Caucasian victim was perceived as more responsible for the crime after deliberation, and
the defendant in the Caucasian condition was given a significantly lighter sentence post
deliberation Therefore, the somewhat negative bias demonstrated toward the Caucasian
victim as demonstrated through the pattern of quantitative results across a number of
items appeared to be exaggerated after deliberation. These findings are discussed in turn.
Deliberation had an overall positive impact upon mock jurors' judgements of the
victim's character, with all of the victims perceived as significantly more reliable and
likeable, and being assigned more sympathy after deliberation, regardless of their race.
In addition, while not significant, there was also a trend for victims to be perceived as
more honest following deliberation. Unfortunately, an examination of the literature failed
to locate any studies ofjury decision-making that examined the difference between jurors'
judgements and attitudes toward the victim before and after deliberation This prevents a
comparison between the findings in the current study and that of other research.
However, given the process of deliberation whereby jurors' commonly discuss the nature
of the crime, and construct a narrative of the events that occurred during the commission
of the crime (Ellsworth, 1989), it is understandable that deliberation may create an overall
positive attitude toward the victim.
The mock jurors' overall favourable attitude toward the victim after deliberation
did not extend to their ratings of the defendant's guilt. Instead, there was an attenuation
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of the guilt ratings, which decreased after deliberation. This finding is somewhat
surprising. Given the fact that deliberation generally lead to more positive ratings of the
victim, one could expect that these positive perceptions would influence the decision that
mock jurors made about the defendant's guilt, i.e., rating the defendant as more guilty
post deliberation. Furthermore, while not significant, the sentence assigned to the
defendant followed a similar pattern after deliberation, with the defendants generally
assigned shorter sentences after deliberation.
This may be a result of two factors. Firstly, the mock jurors in each race
condition spent the majority of their deliberation time discussing the evidence, which was
ambiguous and relatively weak. As a result, the mock jurors may have decided that they
could not render a guilty verdict based upon this evidence, which resulted in decreased
ratings of the defendant's guilt and shorter sentences assigned to the defendant. A second
explanation for this attenuation is the leniency bias that is documented in the literature as
occurring during deliberation (Devine et al., 2001; Kalven & Zeisel, 1 966; MacCoun &
Kerr, 1 988). MacCoun and Kerr ( 1988) define the leniency bias as the process by which
deliberation induces greater leniency in criminal mock jurors. The explanation proposed
to explain this bias may account for the shift in guilt ratings in the present study, namely
that jurors rely on the standard of proof (reasonable doubt) that must be met for criminal
trials. When jurors are unsure about a verdict, research demonstrates that they most
commonly err on the side of caution by selecting acquittal, rather than convicting an
innocent person (MacCoun & Kerr, 1 988). In the present study, jurors may have leaned
toward acquittal due to the instructions received prior to deliberation, which included an
emphasis on the standard of proof. In addition, jurors' discussions of the evidence, which
was relatively weak, may have also influenced their guilt and sentence ratings post
deliberation.
Significant interactions were also demonstrated between deliberation and the race
of the victim, for ratings of the victim's responsibility, and the sentence assigned to the
defendant. Whereas jurors awarded little responsibility for the crime to all victims in pre
deliberation judgements, their perceptions and subsequent responsibility ratings increased
after deliberation, but the Asian victim was awarded significantly less responsibility after
deliberation than before. Therefore, it appears that deliberation reduced any negative bias
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toward the Asian victim, resulting in her being perceived as less responsible after
deliberation. Such results support findings from earlier studies, which demonstrated that
extra-legal biases are attenuated post deliberation (Izzett & Leginski, 1974; Wright &
Wells, 1 985).
However, results also indicate that biases stemming from the victim's race were
exaggerated after deliberation with respect to the Caucasian victim's responsibility for the
crime, and the defendant's sentence in the Caucasian condition. While not significant, a
pattern was observed whereby following deliberation, the Caucasian victim was
perceived as more responsible for the crime. In addition, the defendant in the Caucasian
condition was given a significantly lighter sentence after deliberation. Therefore, it
appears that the somewhat negative bias demonstrated toward the Caucasian victim,
evidenced in the pattern of quantitative results across several of the items, was
exaggerated after deliberation. These results support findings from several studies, which
state that deliberation causes an exaggeration of extra-legal biases (Greene et al., 1999;
Kramer et al., 1990; MacCoun, 1990; Steblay et al., 1999). In particular, Kramer et al.
(1 990) suggests that exposure to a bias during deliberation affects the actual deliberation
process, and that while all members of the jury may not endorse the bias, its introduction
may affect the selection of arguments during deliberation.
Limitations of this Research
Prior to developing the design of the present study, efforts were made to
determine the most frequently identified methodological limitations found in jury
decision-making research, such that these could be minimised in the current study. As a
result, this study included a sample representative of the actual population that comprise a
real jury in Western Australia, a deliberation period followed the court simulation which
was presented in a visual format, standard jury instructions were presented prior to
deliberation, and all mock juries contained no fewer than six individuals.
However, as with all research, there are several caveats to this study that stem
from the methodology utilised and the ability to generalise from these findings. As
previous studies have noted (Diamond, 1997), due to the complexity observed within jury
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trials, such situations are difficult to replicate in controlled laboratory environments, and
as such limitations are inherent in this form of research. Firstly, the mock jurors in the
present study were given a maximum of one hour to deliberate, which is much less than
the time available to actual jurors. In addition, the mock jurors' viewing of a 40 minute
simulated trial not only lacks the same degree of personal involvement than actual jurors
have with real cases, but also offers much less information about a trial than is offered to
real jurors. The results of the study are also limited to perceptions and judgements in the
context of an attempted rape trial. As such, findings from this study cannot be generalized
to crimes other than attempted rape cases, as one could expect that the dynamics found in
sexual offence cases may be different to those found within other crimes, e.g., armed
robbery. In addition, another limitation is that unlike actual juries, the mock jurors in this
study did not deliberate to a final group verdict.
The methodology utilised also presents limitations to this research. While the
simulation of the case presented the trial on videotape, the victim's appearance was
blurred so as to conceal her race. Instead, her race was identified with labels presented
on the information sheet, and an introductory statement to each video. It is highly likely
that the presentation of the victim's race was not salient enough, and that had the victims
been presented visually, for example with the Middle-Eastern victim wearing a veil and
having an accent, different results may have emerged. While the qualitative data and
patterns observed in the quantitative results indicated some degree of racial biases toward
the victims, these were not found to be significant. Therefore, the lack of a specific
visual representation of victims of different race groups could have played a role in the
absence of significant race effects. In addition, the effect sizes were all very small
suggesting that the association between the independent and dependant variables for the
significant deliberation effects and the race and deliberation interactions was not
particularly strong (Cohen, 1988). However, the small sample size may also provide an
explanation for the lack of significant race effects, and the small effect sizes for the
results that were found to be significant.
Despite these limitations, the mock jurors were jury eligible adults who viewed
the evidence and details of the case, received instructions and deliberated as a group. As
such, while the methodological design was not perfect by any standards, the researcher
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believes that the design approximated as closely as possible, the circumstances and
realities of an actual jury.
Future Directions
Although one needs to be cautious about how these findings can be generalised to
the perceptions and judgements of actual jurors, it is likely that the basic cognitive
processes responsible for these results would also play a role in an actual courtroom
setting. In addition, research has demonstrated that prejudice is apparent in Australian
society, and it is likely that this may transfer into the courtroom. Furthermore, while it
appears that deliberation reduced extra-legal biases to a degree, it also appears to have
exaggerated biases. Future research should improve the trial simulation and the
methodology that was utilised in the current study.
Methodological limitations including the blurred picture of the victim, the lack of
an accent and the small sample size could be improved. Using a larger sample and
making the victim's race more salient, for example, by presenting visible and audible
racial features of the victim, may increase the likelihood that more significant results are
identified. Other suggestions include that a final group verdict is acquired from the jury,
a longer deliberation period and different crimes are incorporated, the mean deliberation
time is calculated, as well as information regarding how many juries reached the 1 hour
maximum, and how many were curtailed. The study would also be improved if the
qualitative analysis of these deliberations and their effect on judgments, of victim, crime
and defendant is extended, and more information regarding the participant sample (racial
breakdown, detailed demographics, total participation time) was collected to make
comparison possible.
Summary
The findings of the current research confirm that firstly, mock jurors' decisions
are not formed exclusively by legal, evidential factors but are subject to influences from
the victim's race, and secondly, that deliberation also affects juror's judgements from pre
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to post deliberation. In addition, the results also suggest that deliberation appears to both
attenuate and exaggerate extra-legal biases.
In particular, the qualitative analyses and a pattern observed in the quantitative
data suggest a slight bias toward the Middle-Eastern race. It is suggested that this
apparent prejudice may be a result of two factors. Firstly, the recent world events of
terrorism involving extremist Muslim groups including the bombing of a popular
Australian tourist destination, and the World Trade Centre Towers in New York City by
Middle-Eastern offenders; and secondly, the ongoing controversy regarding alleged
racially based crimes in Sydney. Interestingly, the pattern of results also suggest that the
Aboriginal victim was perceived as the most favourable of all the victims, even more
favourably than the Caucasian victim, which contradicts research findings (Walker,
1 994). This may be due to the mock jurors' heightened awareness of negative cultural
stereotypes in Australian society regarding the Aboriginal race. Through social
desirability factors, the mock jurors may have been trained by society to suppress
prejudiced attitudes toward Aborigines, and counteract these prejudiced feelings and
attitudes by making an effort to perceive the Aboriginal victim in a positive manner.
The findings also indicate that deliberation produced an overall positive impact
upon jurors' perceptions toward the victim, with victims perceived as more likeable,
reliable and gaining more sympathy after deliberation. Finally, it appears that
deliberation both attenuated and exaggerated the effect of the race of the victim on juror
judgements in respect of the victim's responsibility for the crime, and the defendant's
sentence.
Due to a discrepancy between the quantitative and qualitative results, the findings
of this study need to be integrated carefully when interpreting the meaning of these
results for the legal system. The quantitative findings suggest that the legal process is
functioning at an efficient level. More specifically, due to the small variation in scores
and the lack of significant race effects, it appears that the extra-legal variable of victim
race had little influence on jury decision-making. However, the pattern ofresults across
several of the items suggests that there is some level ofracial prejudice, albeit minor,
which is operating. An analysis of the qualitative data supports this finding. As
methodological limitations including the visual representation of the victims and the
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small sample size were present, it is likely that these may have impacted upon the current
findings. It is therefore suggested that there may have been more significant findings if a
larger sample was used and if the visual representation of the victims included visible and
audible racial features. It is important to note however, that even if victim race played a
role in deliberation, the results on verdicts was very minor. This suggests that while race
may play a role in deliberation, it does not necessarily impact upon the verdict.
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Juror Decision-Making Questionnaires
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Date:
Your Gender:

Race of the Victim:
Race of the Defendant:

Juror Decision-Making Questionnaire A - Pre Deliberation
Please read each of the statements carefully and circle the mark on the scale that most
repre ents your opinion. If you make a mistake, clearly mark your new response with a
cro , uch that we know which answer reflects your final opinion. Note that the scale 9
and 1 0 have different words on their ends.
I .The defendant i guilty.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

2. I perceive thi crime to be erious.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

3 . Thi crime had a large impact on the victi m.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

4. I have sympathy for the victim.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

5. The victim is likeable.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree
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6. The victim is reliable.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

7. The victim is honest.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

8. The victim is a valuable member of the community.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

9. To what extent was the victim responsible for this crime?
Not responsible at all

Extremely Responsible

10. If you think the defendant is guilty, recommend a sentence for him:
1 yr

5 yrs

10 yrs
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I
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Date:
Your Gender:
Race of the Victim:
Race of the Defendant:

Juror Decision-Making Questionnaire B - Post Deliberation
Please read each of the tatements carefully and circle the mark on the scale that most
repre ent your opinion. If you make a mistake, clearly mark yo ur new response with a
cross, such that we know which answer reflect your final opinion. Note that the cales 9
and l O have different words on their ends.
1 . To what extent wa the victim re ponsible for this crime?
Extremely Responsible

Not responsible at all

2. The vic tim i a vaJuable member of the community.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

3. The victim i likeable.
Strongly Disagree

4.

Strongly Agree

The defendant is guilty.

Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

5 . The victim is reliable.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree
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6. This crime had a large impact on the victim
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

7. I perceive this crime to be serious.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

8. If you think the defendant is guilty, recommend a sentence for him:
1 yr

5 yrs

10 yrs

9. I have sympathy for the victim.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

1 0. The victim is honest.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree
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Date:
Your Gender:

Race of the Victim:
Race of the Defendant:
Juror Decision-Making Questionnaire C - Post Deliberation 2
l . The race of the victim had no effect on my responses to any of the above tatements.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

If the victim's race did affect your response to the above tatements, please give some
details below:

2. The race of the victim had no effect on the other jurors' perceptions regarding the
crime, victim and defendant.
Strongly Disagree

Strongly Agree

If the victim' race did affect the other j urors' perceptions regarding the crime, victim and
defendant, plea e give some details below.
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Appendix B
Court Transcript used in the Videotaped Court Trial
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TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEOTAPE
Re-Enactment Of Court Case
A brief introduction to the court case will appear on each version of the videotape to once
again prime the participants for the race of the victim:
'You are about to watch the re-enactment of a court case regarding the attempted rape of
a young (Middle-Eastern/Aboriginal/Asian/Caucasian) woman which occurred in June
2000. To protect their anonymity, actors and actresses will play the roles of all involved. '
Cast and Characters:
1. Judge Costello
2. Prosecutor, Mr Allen
3. Barrister, Ms Stedman
4. The Accused, Mark Smith
5. Eyewitness, Andrew White
6. Flatmate, Daniel Taylor
7. Policeman, Sergeant Michelle Howard
8. Clerk
9.The Complainant, Anna Mitchell
Setting:
The transcript was filmed in the original Supreme Courthouse - The Francis Burt Law
Education Centre and Museum, on Wednesday, 23 rd April 2002. It was edited into four
versions, the only difference between each version being the introductory statement
describing the race of the victim, as shown above.
Transcript
Clerk:
Calling case number 524 to session. The people vs. Mark Smith. All risefor the
honourable Judge Costello.
Judge:
The court is now in session.
Clerk:
You may be seated.
Judge:
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The charges brought against the accused, Mark Smith, are that ofthe Attempted Rape of
the complainant on the night ofJune 25th 2000. How does the accused plead?
The Accused:
Not guilty.
Barrister:
Hepleads not guilty, your honour.
Judge:
Would the prosecution care to make their opening remarks?
Prosecution:
Ladies and Gentlemen ofthe jury, we are here today to seekjustice for the complainant,
who was attacked and almost raped. When leaving her place of work late on June 25th,
her car broke down, forcing her to look for the nearest telephone from which she could
call for help. As she walked past a nearby park, she was grabbed and dragged into
bushes where she was thrown onto the ground. As she was held against her will, her
clothes were ripped from her body and her arms violently pinned to the ground.
Frightened for her life, she fought back against her attacker, but was overpowered.
Luckily, a man walking his dog nearby overheard a scuffle and disturbed what appeared
to be a rape! Unfortunately, the attacker was able to escape, but as you will see - the
accused not only fits the description of the attacker, he lives within minutes of the park
and his watch was found at the crime scene. Today you will hear that he was not the
attempted rapist - so listen carefully to the testimony, as you must be sure that the
person responsible for this act will be punished, andjustice will prevail.
Judge:
Defense, would you now care to make your opening remarks?
Barrister:
Ladies and gentlemen ofthe jury, Mark Smith has been wrongly accused ofthis crime.
During the proceedings, I will demonstrate that this is not only a case of mistaken
identity, but that there is no substantial evidence to prove that Mr Smith was even
present at the scene ofthe crime and that he has a solid alibi that places him at home
when the alleged crime occurred. In addition, there is no physical evidence that ties Mr
Smith to this act and the finding of his watch at the crime scene does not indicate he was
there as it was stolen several weeks before the alleged crime occurred. It is up to you to
make sure that this innocent man is not wrongly convicted.
Judge:
Thank you. Were there any exhibits to be entered into the trial?
Prosecution:
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Your honour, Ms Stedman and myself have agreed that the map of Gwelup Reserve from
the Stirling City Council will be handed in as Exhibit A, and that this watch found at the
alleged crime scene be entered as Exhibit B.
Judge:
Does the defense agree to this?
Barrister:
The defense agrees.
Judge:
Very well, hand them forward please. ' (Prosecution gives the exhibits to the clerk).
Would the prosecution please call theirfirst witness?
Prosecution:
Your honour, the people call the complainant, Miss Anna Mitchell.
Clerk:
Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Anna Mitchell:
! do.
Judge:
State your name.
Anna Mitchell:
Anna Mitchell.
Judge:
Be seated please.
Prosecution:
I know this may be very hardfor you, but please tell the court in your own words what
happened on the night ofJune 251h 2000.
Anna Mitchell:
Well I left work a little bit late because it was really busy ...
Prosecution:
What time was this?
Anna Mitchell:
Well I was supposed to knock offwork at 7pm, but I left at about 7.35pm.
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Prosecution:
Where do you work?
Anna Mitchell:
At Villa Bianchi, it 's a cafe on Scarborough Beach.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Anna Mitchell:
And I got into my car and I started driving home.
Prosecution:
Where is home?
Anna Mitchell:
I live on Main Street in Balcatta, so it 's about a 1 0-minute drive from work.
Prosecution:
And who lives with you?
Anna Mitchell:
I live by myself. I moved out ofhome when I got myfull-time job at the cafe about a year
ago.
Prosecution:
Please continue.
Anna Mitchell:
So I was driving and then all of a sudden it made this strange noise and broke down.
Prosecution:
Where did this take place?
Anna Mitchell:
On Karrinyup Road in Gwelup.
Prosecution:
Can you be more precise?
Anna Mitchell:
Well, I was on Karrinyup Road heading awayfrom the coast - so I was heading
east ... and I'djust passed Huntriss Road when I broke down. So I was on Karrinyup
Road, I'd say about 50 metres or less from the Huntriss intersection.
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Prosecution:
Continue. What happened next?
Anna Mitchell:
I was worried. I didn 't know what to do because I don 't know anything about cars and I
didn 't have a mobile so I couldn 't call anyone for help, and no one was around.
Prosecution:
So what time was it at this stage?
Anna Mitchell:
It was 7.50pm. I remember looking at my watch when I broke down to see how late it
was.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Anna Mitchell:
I knew that there was a phone box nearby .... so I...
Prosecution:
Where was the phone box?
Anna Mitchell:
The nearest phone box that I knew ofis on Karrinyup Road at this petrol station on the
corner - I think the street is North Beach Rd. It was probably only a ten-minute walk on
the same side of the road.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Anna Mitchell:
So I decided to walk to the phone box so I could call the RAC.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Anna Mitchell:
Well I hadjust started walking and I was going past this park
Prosecution:
Which park was that?
Anna Mitchell:
Its called Gwelup Reserve.
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Prosecution:
Continue.
Anna Mitchell:
And then all of a sudden, !felt someone grab mefrom behind... ... ... and he pulled me into
the bushes and threw me on the ground ... and I tried to scream but his hand was over my
mouth. I was so scared and I kept thinking, he was going to kill me and that I shouldn 't
have left my car!
Prosecution:
You say he grabbed you from behind and then threw you onto the ground - did you see
the person who grabbed you?
Anna Mitchell:
Yes, I saw him.
Prosecution:
Could you describe what he looked like?
Anna Mitchell:
He was wearing dark tracksuit pants and a burgundy top but I couldn 't properly make
out hisface.
Prosecution:
Could you describe his body - whether he was tall/short, his type of build and so forth?
Anna Mitchell:
Well, he was so strong. He was a really big built man and really tall too, at least 6foot,
possible a bit taller.
Prosecution:
Do you see anybody in court that resembles the attacker?
Anna Mitchell:
The attacker was about the size that the accused is.
Prosecution:
Please continue - you said he threw you on the ground.
Anna Mitchell:
He threw me down and then he climbed on top of me and started tearing at my blouse
and I was trying to stop him but he was so strong (voice starts to break, and puts hand
over eves and looks down) and he pinned my arms above my head, and I couldn 't
move ... '

J OO

Prosecution:
Please continue .. .I know this is hard.
Anna Mitchell:
I tried to scream but he shoved something in my mouth, I think it was a sock or something
and...
Prosecution:
Please continue
Anna Mitchell:
(Starts to ca) He starting pulling at my skirt and I was so frightened and there was
nothing I could do!
Prosecution:
Continue.
Anna Mitchell:
Well, we were struggling, and he was holding my arms against the ground above my head
andfumbling around with his other hand near his pants and I was trying to spit our the
thing in my mouth and I couldn 't ...
Prosecution:
Continue.
Anna Mitchell:
Well, we were struggling and wrestling and then I couldfeel his erect penis pushing
against my leg and ...
Prosecution:
And?
Anna Mitchell:
I was struggling so much but it was no use, he was so strong and there was nothing I
could do (�tarts to ca more) He was trying to move my legs apart with his knees and
pushing at them, and....
Prosecution:
Please continue, what happened next?
Anna Mitchell:
Well, next thing I knew - I heard this dog barking in the background and all of sudden
this man was there, and he yelled out 'Hey what 's going on here? ' and then the attacker
who was trying to rape me got up and ran off.
Prosecution:

101

And then what happened?
Anna Mitchell:
The man who had yelled asked if I was okay and helped me up, and I couldn 't talk. . .
Prosecution:
What happened to the gag ?
Anna Mitchell:
I must have pulled it out when he ran off- I can 't really remember how it all happened. . .
Prosecution:
Do you remember where the gag went?
Anna Mitchell:
I can 't remember - I was struggling to get to myfeet and I think Ijust pulled it out and
dropped it.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Anna Mitchell:
Well I was crying and couldn 't talk. Then the man said we should go to the police, but I
was so scared and I couldn 't stop crying, and I just wanted to go home. He told me not to
be scared and that he would drive me home.
Prosecution:
Carry on.
Anna Mitchell:
Well I told him where I lived and he drove me home and he gave me his phone number
and said that ifI needed to contact him then he could help me.
Prosecution:
And what did you do once you got home?
Anna Mitchell:
Ifelt disgusting and dirty and awful and Ijust wanted to. . . to. . .. just feel better somehow.
I ran a really hot bath and I soakedfor so long, it must have been hours.
Prosecution:
Did you have any bruises or cuts ?
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Anna Mitchell:
We had been wrestling a lot and I had a couple ofsmall bruises on my arms and wrists,
and a couple on my legs too.
Prosecution:
Did your require any medical treatment?
Anna Mitchell:
No.
Prosecution:
Continue. What happened next?
Anna Mitchell:
I went to bed.
Prosecution:
What happened to your clothes?
Anna Mitchell:
I threw them in the rubbish bin outside my house. !just didn 't want them anywhere near
me and I didn 't ever want to wear them again.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Anna Mitchell:
Well I had a rostered day offwork and !just spent the day at home.
Prosecution:
What did you do?
Anna Mitchell:
I tried to keep myselfbusy so I wouldn 't think about it. I was just so upset and needed to
distract myself. So I cleaned the bathroom, the living room... the kitchen ... and I called the
RAC to pick up my car.
Prosecution:
Did you report the attack to the police?
Anna Mitchell:
Yes.
Prosecution:
And when did you do this?
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Anna Mitchell:
About 2 weeks later.
Prosecution:
Why did you wait 2 weeks?
Anna Mitchell:
Well, my parents don 't like me living alone and I didn 't want them to find our what had
happened.
Prosecution:
So what made you report the attack?
Anna Mitchell:
About 2 weeks after the attack, I confided in my bestfriend and she convinced me that I
couldn 't let the man get away with what he had done to me - so I called the police and I
told them what had happened.
Prosecution:
What happened next?
Anna Mitchell:
Well the police took my statement and then I showed them where I was attacked at the
park.
Prosecution:
Who was the police officer that accompanied you?
Anna Mitchell:
Her name was Sergeant Howard.
Prosecution: (gets map off clerk)
I have with me Exhibit A, which is a map of the park Gwelup Reserve. (Holds up map and
unfolds it in front of the witness). Does this resemble the place you were attacked?
Anna Mitchell:
Yes it does.
Prosecution:
Looking at this map can you point out to me the exact place that you were attacked?
Anna Mitchell:
Just here. (points to area CS)
Prosecution:
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I see. Let the record show that by using the grid on the border of the map, the
complainant pointed to area C5. Did theyfind anything at the place where you were
attacked? (returns map to the clerk).

Anna Mitchell:
Yes, theyfound a watch.
Prosecution:

Did you see them find the watch?

Anna Mitchell:
Yes, I did. Sergeant Howard yelled out 'Look at this ' and held it up.
Prosecution:
Thank you. No more questions your honour.
Barrister:

Miss Mitchell, you testified that your car broke down at 7.50pm the night you were
allegedly attacked. Is this correct?

Anna Mitchell:
Yes it is.
Barrister:

Now, June 251h as we all know is in the middle ofwinter. Can you tell me what the
weather was like that night? Was it overcast or was there a clear sky?

Anna Mitchell:

It was heavily overcast. It had been raining when I was at the cafe.

Barrister:

Had it stopped raining when your car broke down?

Anna Mitchell:
Yes.
Barrister:

So I'm assuming that a t 7.50pm in the middle ofwinter - on a rainy night with a heavily
overcast sky that it was also very dark. Is this correct?

Anna Mitchell:
Yes, It was quite dark.
Barrister:
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Just before you were allegedly grabbed andpulled into the bushes by the attacker - can
you tell me ifthere were any streetlights where you were walking, or whether any cars
were passing?
Anna Mitchell:
The street was very quiet and there were no cars. There were some streetlights, but
overall the street wasn 't very well-lit, I think the nearest street light was probably several
metres away - possibly 6 or 7.
Barrister:
You testified that you were pulled into some bushes in the park. Were there any lights in
the park?
Anna Mitchell:
No, it was quite dark.
Barrister:
In this dark light, can you be sure that the attacker is the man accused ofthis crime?
Anna Mitchell:
No, I can't be certain because it was dark. But it looks like him.
Barrister:
It looks like him? But you testified that you could not identify him!
Anna Mitchell:
But ...
Barrister:
Remembering that it was dark, and that many menfit this description - is it possible that
the accused is not the attacker, but that the attacker is another man?
Anna Mitchell:
Yes, I guess so.
Barrister:
No farther questions your honour.
Judge:
Does the prosecution wish to re-examine?
Prosecution:
No, your honour.
Judge:
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Very well, would the prosecution care to call their next witness?
Prosecution:
Your honour, the people call Mr Andrew White.
Clerk:
Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Mr White:
! do.
Judge:
State your name.
Mr White:
Andrew White.
Judge:
Be seated please.
Prosecution:
Mr White, what were you doing on the night ofJune 251\ 2000?
Mr White:
I was walking my dog.
Prosecution:
What time was this?
Mr White:
Well after tea which was around 7.30pm, I drove to the park.... so it would have been
about 7.40 pm by the time I got ready and began walking.
Prosecution:
Where do you live?
Mr White:
In Innaloo - which is quite close, I'd say no more than 3-5 minutes drive to the park.
Prosecution:
And which park is this?
Mr White:
It 's a large park named Gwelup Reserve. It 's on Karrinyup Road.
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Prosecution
Tell me in your own words what happened as you walked your dog by Gwelup Reserve
that night.
Mr White:
Well, I had been walking Baileyfor about 15 minutes at this time, and as we neared the
park I leaned down to take his leash offso he could have a quick run around the park.
Prosecution
So this would have been around 8pm now, adding 15 minutes to the time that you began
walking? Could that be correct?
Mr White:
Yes, it was almost 8pm.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Mr White:
As we ran around the park, we neared some bushes where I heard some noises, kind of
like a scuffle, which I thought, was some animals or something.
Prosecution
What happened next?
Mr White:
Well !jogged over to the bushes to see what the noise was, and I saw the woman .... Anna.
Prosecution:
Do you see the woman in court?
Mr White:
Yes, she is sitting in the back ofthe courtroom dressed in a red top and blackpants.
Prosecution:
Let the record show that the witness identified the complainant as the woman he saw that
night. (gets map off the clerk).
I have with me a map of Gwelup Reserve (pulls out map and holds in front of Mr White)
and surrounding streets. Could you please point out to me exactly where these bushes
were?
Mr White:
Sure - it was about here. (points to same spot on map as Anna)
Prosecution:
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I see. Let the record show that the witness identified C5 as the area in which he saw the
complainant being attacked. (returns map to the clerk). Please continue Mr. White - can
you describe what you saw?
Mr White:
Well there was this man on top ofher struggling with her, and I could see that her clothes
were ripped, and Iyelled out 'hey! ' and the manjumped up really quickly and ran off.
Prosecution:
What did the man look like?
Mr White:
He was really tall, about 6ft 2, with a large build.
Prosecution:
Do you see a similar person in court?
Mr White:
Yes, he looked like the accused, but I cannot say that it was him.
Prosecution:
And didyou see what he was wearing?
Mr White:
He was wearing darkpants, I think they werejeans ... and a darkish top, maybe dark blue
or black.
Prosecution:
Ok, so he was wearing darkpants and a dark top - and then he ran away. Then what
happened?
Mr White:
I helped her up and she was crying.
Prosecution:
Who did you help up?
Mr White:
The complainant.
Prosecution:
Please continue.
Mr White:
I asked her what had happened but she was crying too much and didn 't answer me. I told
her I would help her and not to be scared, but that we should go to the police because I
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could see that the man had ripped her clothes and I thought that he had been trying to
rape her.
Prosecution
Why did you think he was trying to rape her?
Mr White:
When I approached them, she was fighting with him and she was crying. Her clothes
were all torn and she looked scared.
Prosecution
Then what did you do ?
Mr White:
She said she wanted to go home but her car had broken down. I told her I would drive
her and I helped her to my car. Then I drove her home.
Prosecution
What happened next?
Mr White:
Well, she was a mess, and I asked her ifshe was going to be alright and ifshe had
someone who was staying with her - you know, someone she could talk to.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Mr White:
She said she lived alone but that she would be alright and that she just wanted to clean
herself up.
Prosecution:
And then what happened?
Mr White:
She got out and was walking to the house, and I got out and ran up to her and gave her
my business card and told her to call me ifshe needed a witness. She said thank you, and
went inside the house.
Prosecution
Then what happened?
Mr White:
Well, I got in my car and I went home. I didn 't hearfrom her until about 2 weeks later
when she called me,
Prosecution:
Who called you?
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Mr White:
The complainant.
Prosecution:
Please continue.
Mr White:
Well she rang me up and asked me ifI would help her.
Prosecution
What did she say?
Mr White:
She told me that she didn 't want to do anything at first because she wasfrightened and
didn 't want people to know what had happened. But she said after speaking with her best
friend that she wanted to get the man who attacked her.
Prosecution
Continue.
Mr White:
Well, she said she 'd talked to the police and they wanted me to come in and make a
statement. So I went in, made my statement and gave a description of the attacker.
Prosecution:
No more questions.
Barrister:
Mr White, you testified that you took your dogfor a walk that evening? Do you walk
your dog every night?
Mr White:
Most nights.
Barrister:
And what do you usually take with you on your walks?
Mr White:
Well...a leashfor the dog, sometimes a jumper depending on how cold it is, that 's pretty
much it.
Barrister:
So you never take a torch?
Mr White:
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Uh, no.
Barrister:
You testified that you were walking your dog on the night ofJune 25th at approximately
7.45/8pm, is this correct?
Mr White:
Yes.
Barrister:
That 's interesting. Tell me, can you tell me what the weather was like that night?
Mr White:
It was pretty wet. It had been raining earlier and was quite overcast. I was wearing a
raincoat.
Barrister:
So I'm assuming that it was quite a dark night then?
Mr White:
Yes it was.
Barrister:
Tell me about the lighting in the park?
Mr White:
There were not many streetlights, but I could see where I was going. I know the park
well.
Barrister:
Would you say then Mr White, that it was quite dark at the park that night?
Mr White:
Yes, I would.
Barrister:
So can you tell the court how close you were to the attacker when you came across him
and Miss Mitchell in the bushes?
Mr White:
I was about 3 metres away.
Barrister:
And so what colour top did you say the attacker was wearing?
Mr White:
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I'm not sure, it was a dark top though.
Barrister:
In other words, it was too hard to see wasn 't it Mr White
Mr White:
Yes, I guess it was.
Barrister:
So in your testimony, you mentioned that the attacker ran offquickly once you arrived.
Mr White:
Yes he did.
Barrister:
(places same map in front of witness) - Here is the map again - can you point out to the
court where you were and which way you werefacing.
Mr White:
I was here and I wasfacing this way. (points north).
Barrister:
And can you show the court which way he ran off?
Mr White:
He ran awayfrom me. I was here and he ran this way. (points south).
Barrister:
In other words, you saw him from behind. Is that correct?
Mr White:
Yes.
Barrister:
So can you tell the court what his face looked like, for example the colour ofhis eyes or
any distinguishing facialfeatures?
Mr White:
No, I can 't - I didn 't see his face.
Barrister:
So we 've established that it was dark, you are unsure of the colour ofhis clothes, and
you didn 't even seen his face.
Mr White:
Yes.
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Barrister:
So you 're not really sure that the accused is the man who attacked the complainant that
night are you?
Mr White:
Well, no I can 't be certain.
Barrister:
Mr White, my client will testify that he is not the attacker. Do you have anything to
comment about that?
Mr White:
No.
Barrister:
No more questions.
Judge:
Does the prosecution wish to re-examine?
Prosecution:
No your honour.
Judge:
Would the prosecution care to call their next witness?
Prosecution:
Your honour, the people call Sergeant Michelle Howard
Clerk:
Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you
God?
Sergeant Howard:
! do.
Judge:
State your name and rank.
Sergeant Howard:
Sergeant Michelle Howardfrom Scarborough Police station.
Judge:
Please be seated.
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Prosecution:
How many years have you been in service Sergeant?
Sergeant Howard:
27 this year.
Prosecution:
Can you please tell the courtroom in your own words about your involvement in this
case?
Sergeant Howard:
Ofcourse. I was assigned to this case when a call was made to the department on the 3rd
ofJuly by a woman claiming to have been attacked.
Prosecution:
Who was the lady in question?
Sergeant Howard:
It was Anna Mitchell.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Sergeant Howard:
She called and claimed 2 weeks earlier on the night ofJune 251h a man had tried to rape
her.
Prosecution:
Did you take her call?
Sergeant Howard:
Yes, the call was put through to me.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Sergeant Howard:
I asked her to come in to make a formal statement which she did that afternoon, the 3 rd of
July. After I had gathered some information, I asked her to take me to the scene of the
alleged crime, which was Gwelup Reserve. When we got to the park, she showed me
where she was attacked.
Prosecution: (gets map off the clerk)
Here is a map of the park. Could you please point out where the crime scene was?
Sergeant Howard:
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Just here. (points to area C5).
Prosecution:
Let the record show that the witness also identified C5 as the area as the crime scene.
Please continue, what happened next? (returns map to the clerk).
Sergeant Howard:
Upon looking at the crime scene - I discovered a man's watch with a broken band, and an
inscription and stamp on it,
Prosecution:
Do you have a photograph of the watch?
Sergeant Howard:
Unfortunately not. It was an extremely busy day and the photographer was unable to
make it to the park.
Prosecution:
Please continue.
Sergeant Howard:
We collected the watch but unfortunately as 2 weeks had passed, we were unable to find
any forensic evidence.
Prosecution:
What did the inscription and stamp say?
Sergeant Howard:
It said 'M.Smith, Graduation, 1 995,' and the stamp had the name of a shop, Tom's
Jewelers.
Prosecution:
And then what happened?
Sergeant Howard:
We went to Tom 's Jewelers and I talked to the manger who showed me the records of
sales. I was able to determine the name and address of the buyer, which was Melanie
Smith. Upon calling her, I determined that the watch had been purchasedfor her son,
Markfor his graduation some years ago.
Prosecution:
And what happened next?
Sergeant Howard:
I contacted Mark Smith that same day on July 3rd - and asked ifhe would come in for
questioning with regard to the finding ofhis watch at the crime scene. He came in that
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afternoon and was questioned. Upon seeing the watch, he said that it was his and that it
had been stolen at a football game around a month earlier.
Prosecution:
Was a police reportfiled with regard to the theft ofhis watch?
Sergeant Howard:
No, it was not.
Prosecution:
Please continue.
Sergeant Howard:
Hefurther claimed that on the night of the attack he was at home. Upon being advised
that he was a suspect in the attempted rape ofMiss Mitchell, he became angry and
refused to make a statement, upon which he wasformally charged.
Prosecution:
Was anyone else interviewed with regards to this case?
Sergeant Howard:
Yes, we also interviewed the previous witness, Andrew White with regards to the 25th
June. He gave a description ofthe attacker but a lineup was not worthwhile as his
description was only of the size and build of the attacker.
Prosecution:
Finally, you mentioned that the watch, which was identified by Mark Smith as being his
own, also had a broken band. (Gets watch off the clerk).
Here is the watch, labeled as Exhibit B (holds up watch in plastic bag). Can you tell us
about the nature of the break?
Sergeant Howard:
Well, no one can be sure of how it broke, but it appears to have been snapped.
Prosecution:
(Returns watch to the clerk) As ifsomeone had been wrestling with another?
Sergeant Howard:
It 's possible.
Prosecution:
Can you tell me Sergeant where the accused lives?
Sergeant Howard:
He reported to me that he lives in Karrinyup, on Taunton Way.
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Prosecution:
Approximately how farfrom the crime scene, which is Gwelup Reserve - is Taunton
Way?
Sergeant Howard:
It 's very close, I'd say approximately 1.2 kilometres.
Prosecution:
So approximately how long would it take to drive or walk there?
Sergeant Howard:
I'd say no more than a JO-minute walk, and in the car, well only a few minutes.
Prosecution:
Thank you, no more questions your honour.
Judge:
Does the prosecution have any more witnesses?
Prosecution:
No, your honour. The prosecution is closing its case.
Judge:
Defense, would you like to call yourfirst witness?
Barrister:
Your honour, the defense calls Mr Mark Smith.
Clerk:
Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you god?
Mark Smith:
! do.
Judge:
State your name.
Mark Smith:
Mark Smith.
Judge:
Be seated please.
Barrister:
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Mark Smith, could you please tell the court where you were on the night ofJune 251h
2000?
Mark Smith:
Sure, I was at home watching television.
Barrister:
What program were you watching?
Mark Smith:
I was flipping between the channels, mainly watching 60 minutes.
Barrister:
What time was this?
Mark Smith:
Around 7.30, 8pm.
Barrister:
Is there anyone who can testify that you were home that night?
Mark Smith:
Yes there is. My roommate, Daniel Taylor was also at home.
Barrister:
Lets clear something else up. The court has also heard that your watch wasfound at the
crime scene. How do you explain this?
Mark Smith:
Well I had been playingfootball at Gwelup Reserve several weeks earlier.
Barrister:
Could you be more specific? Do you have an exact date and time?
Mark Smith:
It was Saturday, the 21h ofMay. We were playing most of the afternoon. But I think we
probably began playing around lunch andfinished around 4 or 5pm.
Barrister:
Continue. What happened while you were playingfootball?
Mark Smith:
Well - before we began playing, I removed my watch and put it into the pocket ofmy
jacket, which I took off When we hadfinished playing, I noticed that myjacket had been
stolen. I have not seen my watch or myjacket since.
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Barrister:

And is there anyone who can confirm that you were playingfootball at Gwelup Reserve
on the 2ih ofMay?

Mark Smith:
Yes, Daniel was playingfootball with me.
Barrister:

No more questions your honour.

Prosecution:
(gets watch off the clerk) - Mark Smith, this is Exhibit B, the watchfound at the crime
scene at which Miss Mitchell was attacked. Can you identify this watch? (shows watch).
Mark Smith:
Yes, it is my watch.
Prosecution:
(gives the watch back to the clerk) - We havejust heard your testimony that your watch
was stolen some weeks ago. Do you have any proof that your watch was stolen along with
yourjacket?
Mark Smith:

No I don 't. I didn 't see who took it and none ofmyfriends did either.

Prosecution:
Sergeant Howard testified that no police report was filed with regards to the theft ofyour
watch. Can you explain this?
Mark Smith:
Well, I didn 't think to report it, it wasn 't a big deal.
Prosecution:
That appears to be an awfully convenient explanation for the placement ofyour watch at
the crime scene doesn 't it?
Mark Smith:

Maybe, but it is what happened.

Prosecution:
Sergeant Howard also mentioned that the watchband was also broken, can you tell us
anything about this?
Mark Smith:
Well, it wasn 't broken when I took it offto playfootball.
Prosecution:
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Well perhaps it was broken in a struggle then.
Mark Smith:
Maybe.
Prosecution:
Lets move on. Howfar away is Gwelup Reserve from your home?
Mark Smith:
It 's about 4 streets away.
Prosecution:
Ok, so how long would it take you to drive there?
Mark Smith:
A minute or two.
Prosecution:
And walk?
Mark Smith:
I don 't know, I guess about 5 to JO minutes?
Prosecution:
So you could quite easily have walked to the park and tried to rape Miss Mitchell
couldn 't you?
Mark Smith:
Yes, but I didn 't!
Prosecution:
Mark Smith - you testified that Daniel was home with you on the night that Miss Mitchell
was attacked.
Mark Smith:
Yes.
Prosecution:
Did anyone ofyou make coffee that night?
Mark Smith:
No.
Prosecution:
Did you communicate at all?
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Mark Smith:
I really can 't remember - maybe.
Prosecution:
What was Daniel doing that night?
Mark Smith:
He was watching a video.
Prosecution:
What video was it?
Mark Smith:
I can 't really remember - I think it was The Terminator.
Prosecution:
No further questions your honour.
Judge:
Does the defense wish to re-examine?
Barrister:
No your honour.
Judge:
Defense, would you like to call your next witness ?
Barrister:
Your honour, the defense calls Mr Daniel Taylor.
Clerk:
Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you God?
Daniel Taylor:
I do.
Judge:
State your name.
Daniel Taylor:
Daniel Taylor.
Judge:
Please be seated.
Barrister:
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Mr Taylor, could you please explain to the court your relationship to the accused?
Daniel Taylor:
He 's my roommate. We have been living in the same apartment for about 18 months now.
Barrister:
I see, and where were you on the night of the 251h June 2000?
Daniel Taylor:
I was at home.
Barrister:
And what time did you first arrive home?
Daniel Taylor:
After work, about 6pm.
Barrister:
I see, and was anyone else home when you arrived?
Daniel Taylor:
Yes, Mark was home too. He usually gets home a bit earlier than me.
Barrister:
What was Mark doing when you got home?
Daniel Taylor:
Watching television.
Barrister:
What was he watching?
Daniel Taylor:
I can't really remember.
Barrister:
Tell me, did you, at any period, leave the house that night?
Daniel Taylor:
No I did not.
Barrister:
And did Mark leave the house that night?
Daniel Taylor:
No he did not.
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Barrister:
So, on the night ofthe attack on Ms Mitchell, Mark Smith was at home with you, is this
correct?
Daniel Taylor:
Yes it is.
Barrister:
Can you also tell us ifyou have playedfootball recently with Mark Smith?
Daniel Taylor:
Yes, we played a few weeks back at Gwelup Reserve.
Barrister:
What date was this?
Daniel Taylor:
It was the 21h ofMay, a Saturday.
Barrister:
(Gets watch off the clerk) - Here is a watch (brings bag to Daniel). Can you identify who
is belongs to ?
Daniel Taylor:
It looks like Mark 's watch.
Barrister:
Can you tell the court when you last saw the watch ?
Daniel Taylor:
I can 't remember an exact date - but it was a while ago. I'd say at least a month.
Barrister:
Mark stated that his watch was stolen that day. Can you confirm this?
Daniel Taylor:
Yes, I do recall him saying that he had lost his watch.
Barrister:
No more questions your honour.
Prosecution:
MrTaylor - I'd like you to describe for me in detail what the layout ofyour house is.
Daniel Taylor:
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Well, as you walk in the front door, we have a large open area. The kitchen and table are
on your left and to the right is the lounge area, where we have our television and
couches.
Prosecution:
Continue.
Daniel Taylor:
Further down, we have our two bedrooms and behind these is the bathroom and the
laundry.
Prosecution:
So there is only one door?
Daniel Taylor:
Yes.
Prosecution:
And the only walls are the ones surrounding the apartment itself, and those that section
off the bedrooms and the laundry ? Is this correct?
Daniel Taylor:
Yes.
Prosecution:
I see. Mr Taylor, when you arrived home where was Mark?
Daniel Taylor:
He was in the lounge room watching television.
Prosecution:
And tell me what else happened that night?
Daniel Taylor:
I made tea, served up some extra for Mark and went to my room.
Prosecution:
Did either ofyou make coffee that night?
Daniel Taylor:
No, I don 't think we did, I can 't remember.
Prosecution:
Did you talk to Mark during the course of the evening?
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Daniel Taylor:
I don 't know. I can 't remember.
Prosecution:
So what did you do once you went to your room that night?
Daniel Taylor:
I watched a video.
Prosecution:
What video did you watch?
Daniel Taylor:
Mission Impossible.
Prosecution:
Are you sure that it was Mission Impossible that you watched? And not The Terminator?
Daniel Taylor:
Yes, I am sure.
Prosecution:
So you watched Mission Impossible in YOUR room?
Daniel Taylor:
Yes, because Mark was watching a television program and didn 't want to watch my
video.
Prosecution:
And what time did you put on the video ?
Daniel Taylor:
At 7.30pm I think, I can 't be sure of the exact time, but it was around then.
Prosecution:
And how long did the video go for?
Daniel Taylor:
About two hours.
Prosecution:
So from approximately 7.30 to 9.30pm you were in your room watching a video, is this
correct?
Daniel Taylor:
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Yes.
Prosecution:
And was your bedroom door open or closed while you watched the video?
Daniel Taylor:
It was closed.
Prosecution:
Did you at any time while watching the video venture out ofyour room to any other room
of the house, say to the lounge room or the toilet?
Daniel Taylor:
No, I watched it from start to finish.
Prosecution:
And when the video finished what did you do ?
Daniel Taylor:
I got a glass of waterfrom the kitchen and went to bed.
Prosecution:
And did you see Mark as you went to the kitchen?
Daniel Taylor:
No, all the lights had been switched off, so Ifigured he had gone to bed.
Prosecution:
Did you check his bedroom to see if this was true?
Daniel Taylor:
No, ofcourse not.
Prosecution:
I see, so for two hours between 7.30 and 9.30pm you were busy in your room watching a
video and you did not leave the room once.
Daniel Taylor:
Yes.
Prosecution:
And is it possible Mr Taylor, due to your description of the house - that Mark could have
left the house without you knowing?
Daniel Taylor:
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Yes he could have, but he would have told me if he was going out.
Prosecution:
But how can you be certain that he did in fact stay home?
Daniel Taylor:
Well I can 't.
Prosecution:
Is it possible Mr Taylor, that Mark did infact leave the house around 7.30pm and return
before or even after you finished watching your video and you did not know?
Daniel Taylor:
Ofcourse its possible but ...
Prosecution:
(interrupts) That 's all we need to hear Mr Taylor. I think we 've confirmed that Mr
Smith 's alibi is questionable to say the least. Lets talk about this watch that apparently
was stolen. Did you see Mark wearing that watch before you started playingfootball that
day at the park?
Daniel Taylor:
No, I didn 't notice.
Prosecution:
So when did Mark tell you that his watch had been stolen and where did he say it had
been stolenfrom?
Daniel Taylor:
A couple ofweeks after we playedfootball he told me that he had lost it that day.
Prosecution:
So, you really do not know for sure that Mark was even wearing the watch that day. For
all you know, Mark may not even have taken his watch to the park that day and had it
stolen, for all you know, Mark may have worn that watch a couple of weeks later and had
it ripped off by Miss Mitchell when he attacked her . . . which is why it was found at the
park. ..
Daniel Taylor:
Well . . .
Prosecution:
So you cannot answer that?
Daniel Taylor:
No.

1 28

Prosecution:
No more questions your honour.
Judge:
Does the defense wish to re-examine the witness?
Defense:
Yes, your honour. Mr Taylor, when the prosecution asked you ifit was possible that
Mark left the house and you were unaware, he interrupted you. What was it that you
wanted to say?
Daniel Taylor:
Well, I cannot be sure but Mark would have told me if he was leaving.
Defense:
Thank you. No more questions your honour.
Judge:
Are there any more witnesses?
Barrister:
No your honour. The defense closes its case.
Judge:
Very well, we'll hear your final remarks after a short recess.
FADE OUT AND THEN IN TO DEMONSTRATE PASSED TIME.
Prosecution:
Ladies and Gentleman, you havejust heard the testimony ofseveral witnesses, the
complainant and the accused. The defense would like you to believe that isjust a form of
mistaken identity and that Mark Smith was at home at the time of the attempted rape of
Miss Mitchell. However, not only does the description of the attackerfrom both Miss
Mitchell and Andrew White match that of the accused, but his alibi is highly
questionable. His roommate is not even certain that he was indeed home - in fact as he
lives only minutes awayfrom the park where Miss Mitchell was attacked, he could quite
easily have walked there and back and attacked her within a short period of time!! Not
only this, but Mark Smith 's watch was also found at the � of the crime. Listen to the
facts of the case as they stand before you as it is up to Elli. to convict this man so that he
won 't attack any more women.
Barrister:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, many men live in the same street as Mr. Smith - not to
mention the other streets surrounding Gwelup Park, also giving them ample opportunity
to attack the complainant. His address should not convince you that he is the attacker,
because as we all know - people who attack others do not have to be on foot, they may
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also have access to vehicles, meaning a number of people in surrounding areas would
also have the opportunity to attack Miss Mitchell! Mr. Smith may fit the very brief
description given by the two witnesses, but lets not forget that it was very dark in the
bushes and one witness only saw the attacker from behind as he ran away. Hardly enough
time to form an accurate description. How can they be sure that it was actually Mr Smith
they saw and not someone else? In addition to this, there is absolutely no physical
evidence that ties Mr. Smith to the crime. The fact that his watch was found at the scene
of the crime does nothing but tell us that the thief had also been at the bushes since the
watch was stolen. There is no real evidence against Mr Smith. Don't convict an innocent
man. PICTURE TO FADE.

